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Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, the former Crownlands of 
Austria-Hungary which now make up the western half of 
Czechoslovakia, had for centuries a population mixture of 
40% German, 60% Czech. The national reawakening of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries pitted the majority 
Czechs against their German minority master. This, coupled 
with the social upheavals caused by the industrial 
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revolution, brought Czechs and Germans in Bohemia to center 
stage in the nationality conflict in the multinational 
Empire. 
The universal practice in industrializing nations of 
the population to shift from rural to the industrial centers 
was especially significant in Bohemia, for the Germans 
controlled the cities and large industry as well as the 
great mining concerns located in the all-German districts of 
the Crownlands' rim mountain ranges. The sudden influx of 
Czechs seeking unskilled work heightened job competition and 
resulted in racial ill-will which eventually found 
expression in the social and political milieu of the times. 
The more radical German elements, of which Bohemia was 
a stronghold, advocated the complete suppression of Czech 
national aspirations and sought to maintain the German 
Herrenvolk idea in Cisleithania. Their Czech counterparts 
regarded the Bohemian Germans as merely invaders or 
colonists--in any case subject to the Czech majority well 
within Bohemia. 
There were, however, moderates on both sides who sought 
compromise. The German-Bohemian moderate nationalists 
advocated the administrative partitioning of Bohemia along 
ethnic lines--Zweiteilung. Czech leaders, with a few 
outstanding exceptions, rejected Zweiteilung, arguing that 
the historic borders of the old kingdom of Wenseclas were 
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inviolable--externally and internally. The right of the 
Czechs to maintain their state within the Empire--
Staatsrecht--became the Czech battle cry against the German 
concept of Zweiteilung. 
Between 1880 and 1914 one settlement proposal after 
another was rejected. Chances for a settlement waned as 
tensions increased. 
During World War I Czech exiles in Paris and London, 
with the blessings of the Entente, pushed for a Czechoslovak 
independent state (before even radical Czech nationalists 
had envisioned a state within the Empire). The 
Bohemian-Germans continued to push for Zweiteilung. 
At war's end the Czechs proclaimed their republic but 
the Bohemian Germans refused to recognize Prague and instead 
swore allegiance to the new Austrian republic, with Vienna 
in turn claiming German Bohemia. 
The autonomous Province of German-Bohemia lasted a 
stormy six weeks while both sides waged diplomatic war, each 
seeking the blessings of the victorious Allied Powers. 
Slowly, beginning in November 1918, Czechoslovak troops 
began occupying the German districts, meeting virtually no 
resistance. By mid-December the Czechs controlled all 
Bohemia. 
By the opening sessions of the Paris Peace Conference 
the Czechoslav Delegation, with Foreign Minister Eduard 
4 
Bene~ at its head, could present a diplomatic and de facto 
fait accompli to the body, which accepted Czechoslovak 
demands and incorporated 3.5 million Germans along with 
their 80% German inhabited area into the new Republic of 
Czechoslovakia. 
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PREFACE 
Long before Adolf Hitler made his claims that the so-
called Sudetenlands of Czechoslovakia were his own, the idea 
of the ethnic partitioning of Bohemia had been a heated 
issue. As early as 1848 proposals along such lines earned 
serious consideration in the Austrian parliament. 
Nowhere in the Austro-Hungarian Empire were two 
nationalities so pitted against each other as were the 
Germans and the Czechs in Bohemia. More Western in 
historical experience and culture than any of their Slav 
sisters, the Bohemian Czechs claimed the same rights to 
national integrity as did the Bohemian Germans during the 
nineteenth century. The Czech challenge to Austro-German 
hegemony naturally resulted in a clash. 
This work will examine that clash and the issue of the 
ethnic partition in Bohemia by concentrating on three 
principal phases of its development. 
First, Czech-German relations from 1848 to 1870 will be 
examined with special emphasis on the socio-political impact 
of the industrial revolution on the two nationalities in 
neo-absolutist Austria. 
Secondly, the German-Bohemian reaction to the rising 
Czech Bourgeoisie and especially to the great Czech 
migration into the all-German industrial areas along 
Bohemia's mountainous rim will be examined with special 
attention given to the German attempts to thwart the 
"Czechification" of all Bohemia by a great variety of 
proposals aimed at Bohemia's administrative partition. 
vii 
Lastly, this work will examine the continued German-
Bohemian efforts during the First War, their successful but 
short-lived establishment of an actual autonomous Province 
of German-Bohemia within Czechoslovak-claimed area, and the 
international reactions during the last months of 1918. 
The term "Bohemia" often applies to the three 
Crownlands of Bohemia made up of Bohemia, Moravia and 
Silesia. In this work confusion is spared by referring to 
the singular Crownland of Bohemia as "Bohemia" or "Crownland 
of Bohemia." All three in a group are referred to as "the 
Crownlands," the "Historic Crownlands," etc. 
CHAPTER I 
HISTORIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE CZECH-GERMAN CONFLICT 
Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, first president of the 
Republic of Czechoslovakia, gave his inaugural address in 
Prague on December 22, 1918. In reference to the largest 
minority group, which made up nearly one-third of the new 
state's population, President Masaryk said: 
• • • as far as the Germans in our lands are 
concerned, our programme has been known for a long 
time: the territory on which they settled is our 
territory and will remain so. We have created this 
State and this determines the constitutional 
position of our Germans who originally entered the 
country as immigrants and colonists. [l] 
The problems arising from a considerable second 
nationality within Western Czechoslovakia are older than the 
empire from which this "successor state" emerged. To 
better understand the problem and the wide variety of 
proposed solutions a brief look back to its origins is in 
order. 
PRE-HABSBURG 
Who was there first? The general consensus is that 
Celtic tribes, referred to as "Boii" by Tacitus, inhabited 
the Bohemian Basin first [2]. These eventually mixed with 
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pre-Christian Germans penetrating from the north around 300 
B.C. During the next 800 years the Boii of Tacitus' 
"Boiohaemum" migrated into what is now Bavaria " •.• taking 
the Celt name which apparently developed into 'Baiowari'" 
[3], a recognizable ancestor of the name today. 
In any case, Slavic peoples moved into the resulting 
vacuum and settled extensively in Moravia and Bohemia. "It 
is probably correct to regard the period from the sixth to 
the twelfth century as a period when the inhabitants of 
Bohemia and Moravia were almost entirely Slav" [4]. 
During the Christian era the region developed into an 
ethnically Slav region with a Western orientation. Prague 
became a bishopric under the Archbishop of Mainz in 973 and, 
thus, placed the Crownlands of King Wenceslas under 
extensive German influence. Except for a brief respite--the 
German exodus during Hussite times--this German influence 
was to last until 1918. 
From the Church came German clergy and lay 
professionals. These were followed by German miners who 
settled in the silver-rich mountainous areas in Bohemia's 
Randgebiet or rim areas of the country. By the late 
thirteenth century German artisans, bourgers and merchants 
had set themselves up in the growing commercial centers of 
Prague, Brunn, Budweis, Pilsen and others. 
The attraction was great, for the emigres enjoyed 
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extended privileges over the indigenous Slavs [SJ. 
Meanwhile Prague had become the administrative center 
of the Holy Roman Empire. It boasted its first university, 
founded by Emperor Charles IV (King of Bohemia, Charles I) 
in 1348, where Czechs as well as Germans attended and 
taught. 
This "Golden Age" came to a close characteristically 
due to Czech-German strife centered at the university after 
Charles' death. As mentioned above, there followed an 
exodus of German learned men from Bohemia. The exodus was 
short lived, however. 
By the beginning of the sixteenth century Germans were 
again moving into the Historic Provinces of Bohemia, Moravia 
and Silesia [6]. 
This time, however, the heretic Hussite Czech was 
sharing the Crownlands with heretic Lutheran Germans. A 
lull in the German-Czech nationality conflict therefore 
resulted as they faced their common enemy together--the 
Roman church [7]. 
The political ties between the Bohemian Crownlands and 
Hungary predate the inclusion of the Austrian Duchies. The 
so-called "Personal Union" of the crowns of St. Wenceslas 
and St. Stephan dates from 1490 with the marriage of 
Ladislav II, first of the Jagiellon dynasty, to the sister 
of the king of Hungary. Their issue, Louis II, King of 
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Bohemia and Hungary, married a Habsburg. A condition of the 
marriage contract was that if Louis II produced no heirs, 
the entire Jagiellon lands would fall into Habsburg hands. 
In 1526 at the Battle of Mohacs Louis fell, and without 
an heir. The Jagiellon kingdom, including Hungary, became a 
possession of the Habsburg Hausmacht and there remained for 
four hundred years. "This ••• marriage set the seal upon 
the amazing match-making achievements of the house of 
Habsburg" [8]. 
AUSTRIAN BOHEMIA TO 1848 
Fifteen twenty-six marks the date when the German 
miners, merchants and churchmen of the Bohemian Crownlands 
were no longer foreign invitees, but fellow Germans of the 
ruling Habsburgs. 
The Habsburg "Kings of Bohemia" greatly Germanized the 
"Historic Crownlands," as they were called. Even the Czech 
nobility found it necessary to adapt to the new 
circumstances. But when, in the seventeenth century, German 
became the official language of government in Prague; and as 
ever more land was falling into German hands, the Czech 
nobility, still a viable force, became determined to halt 
the German advance. "In 1615 the Diet [at Prague] forbade 
the acquisition of land in Bohemia by anyone who could not 
speak Czech" [9]. 
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This marks the first official designation of 
nationality based on language in the Crownlands or, put 
another way, the use of language as a weapon against an 
opposing nationality. The language question shall 
eventually become the key focal point in territorial 
partition movements. 
In any case all Czech aspirations were dashed five 
years later at White Mountain. From 1620 on, the dignity of 
Bohemia as a kingdom ceased to exist as the Crownlands 
became a virtual province of Habsburgian Austria. 
For this study, the consequences of the Thirty Years 
War which followed White Mountain are significant, for they 
mark the virtual disappearance of a viable Czech nobility 
and its particularist local power. The estates of the 
erstwhile Czechs so troublesome to the Emperor were 
confiscated and distributed among those noblemen, Czech and 
German, upon whom Vienna could rely [10]. 
An old stratification was strengthened. 
• • • the general effect of the upheavals of the 
seventeenth century was to create a state of 
affairs in which the upper strata were German and 
the lower were Czech. Thus, the outlines of the 
social question of the nineteenth century were 
beginning to appear. [11] 
Also, a new wave of Germans ranging from displaced 
princes to peasants filled the vacuum in the greatly 
depopulated Crownlands. 
••• the territory inhabited by Germans in Bohemia 
and Moravia increased during the seventeenth 
century so that by 1700 the language [and so 
ethnic] frontiers were drawn for some two hundred 
years. [13] 
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With the ethnic borders basically fixed by 1700 the 
stage was set for the marathon tug of war between Czech and 
German concerning the ethno-linguistically based territorial 
partition of Bohemia. (See Appendix, Map 1.) 
Two remaining periods must first be examined which 
contribute to the definition of Czech-German relations. The 
first is the Enlightenment, which tended to strip both Czech 
and German power within Bohemia and subjugate them to 
Vienna; and the second is the romantic national awakening 
which gave the socially repressed Czechs a feeling of 
renewed self. 
As mentioned above, by 1700 the indigenous powers 
within Bohemia had been greatly curtailed. The estates 
general of the Bohemian Crownlands, according to the 
Vernewerte Landesordnung or "Decree of Denial" of 1627, no 
longer had the right to elect their own king. They would 
have their King of Bohemia but only because Bohemia became a 
hereditary possession of the Habsburgs [13]. 
During the Aufklirung, a string of "enlightened 
desp'otsi• further reduced the political independence of 
Bohemia and Moravia by removing their respective Diets from 
Prague and Brunn and placing their workings within the 
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Viennese bureaucracy. In short, there no longer existed 
decision-making bodies within the Bohemian Crownlands. 
The positive side of the centralizing policies, 
especially under Maria Theresia, was that the new state of 
affairs fell just as hard on the German estates in the 
Crownlands as it did on the Czechs. "It was her 
[Theresia's] policy to reduce the Estates to insignificance" 
(14]. By so doing she created a kind of "leveling" among 
the nationalities. She was attempting to create what 
Professor Seton-Watson refers to as an "a-national empire." 
Joseph II brought reforms with his reign. He threw out 
the Jesuits who had monopolized education in their attempt 
to root out Hussitism in the Crownlands; the "Robot" system 
of servitude which had reduced the peasantry to virtual 
serfdom was officially abolished (though in fact it 
continued for another century) • 
These reforms, however, mattered little to the average 
Czech. The general inertia of the past could not be 
legislated away so easily. By the end of Joseph's reign in 
1790, "Bohemia was totally in the hands of the [Viennese] 
bureaucrats; it was officially German, tolerantly Catholic 
and wholly absolute in form of government" (15]. 
For the nationalities of the Habsburg lands, especially 
the Czechs, the very reactionary centralizing policies of 
Vienna provoked a need to be heard. This, coupled with the 
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new ideas of equality and liberty embraced in the French 
Revolution, had a strong effect on all suppressed 
nationalities of the empire. 
A spirit of nationalism was in the air. This, mixed 
with the rationalist movement of eighteenth century France, 
Herter's infectious philosophy of the identity of language 
with nation all had a profound effect on especially the 
Czechs. The almost forgotten works of Hus, Chelcicky and 
Comenius were revived and studied [16]. 
For this study the interpretations of Professor 
Wiskemann are especially apt. 
Out of the Age of Enlightenment • • • was born the 
Romantic Revival and the spirit of modern 
nationalism and the Czech-German problem as we know 
it to-day [ 19 3 8] • [ 1 7] 
The greatest contributer to the Czech national revival 
was Franticek Palacky. His famous multi-volume work, 
A History of the Czech People (1836), had much to do with 
kindling Czech nationalist pride in a past that could stand 
up to that of the so-called culturally superior Germans. 
"Palack§ hoped that a proper presentation of [Czech] 
history, notably the epoch of its greatest achievement, 
would help arouse the nation" [18]. 
It is indeed ironic and telling of the times that in 
order to assure publication of his work, Palacky had to write 
his History of the Czech People in the German language. As 
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; . 
a matter of fact, Palacky required the patronage of one 
Count Sternberg, a German, in order to get the work past the 
Viennese censors. 
This was, however, not so odd, for there had been a 
marriage of convenience between the Czech and German 
nobility in order to attempt a re-establishment of home 
rule. This link-up of Czech and German for the common sake 
of "Bohemianism" was bound to fail, however. The current 
language theories linking tongue, race and nation were too 
strong. In the next decades, many Czechs were to look east 
of their borders toward their Slav brethren and identify 
with the concept of "Slavism," while the Bohemian Germans 
were to look west toward the Hohenzollern-Prussian brand of 
"Germanism" and to turn away from the "Rome-influenced" 
"Slav-infested" Habsburgs. 
10 
CHAPTER I ENDNOTES 
1. President Masaryk's inaugural address of December 22, 
1918, quoted from J. w. Bruegel, Czechoslovakia Before 
Munich: The German Minority Problem and British Appeasement 
Policy (London: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 
pp. 19-20. 
2. See Tacitus' Germania, Nos. 28, 42. 
3. Elizabeth Wiskemann, Czechs and Germans: A Study in 
the Historic Provinces of Bohemia and Moravia (London: 
Oxford University Press [under auspices of the Royal 
Institute of International Affairs], 1938), p. 3. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Oscar Taszi, The dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 
38-9. 
6. Wiskemann, Czechs and Germans, p. 9. 
7. Seton-Watson, Czechs and Slovaks, p. 90. 
8. Ibid., p. 86. 
9. Wiskemann, p. 9. 
10. Ibid., p. 10. 
11. Ibid. 
12. Ibid. 
13. Robert A. Kann, A History of the Habsburg Empire 1521-
1918 (Berkeley: University of Califronia Press, 1974), 
p:5°4. 
14. Seton-Watson, Czechs and Germans, p. 140. 
15. Ibid., p. 161. 
16. Ibid. pp. 161-2. 
17. Wiskemann, p. 14. 
11 
~ 
18. Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, The Meaning of Czech History 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 
compiled 1974), p. 123. 
CHAPTER II 
FROM THE REVOLUTION OF 1848 TO 1890: 
POLITICAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS 
The February Revolution of 1848 in France, based as it 
was on such high-minded notions of fraternity, liberty and 
equality, became, once imported to central Europe, distorted 
to accomodate the prevailing social and political grievances 
whose roots lie in racial rivalries. 
For this study three main levels of this rivalry must 
be considered: first, the position of Austria in relation 
to the rest of the German Confederation; second, the 
position of Bohemia within the Danubian Empire; and finally, 
the conditions within binational Bohemia. 
The upheavals of 1848 revived the question last heard 
in 1815 with the establishment of the German Confederation: 
Grossdeutschland or Kleindeutschland? 
The grossdeutsch idea visualized a united federal 
Germany with Austria included (excluding Hungary, Galicia 
and most of Slavonia) • 
[It] represented the wishes ••• of the [German] 
Austrian liberals and moderate conservatives • • • 
the liberals believed that the German association 
and Austria's independence as a great power were 
compatible. [1] 
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The kleindeutsch advocates, who foresaw Austria out 
from the Confederation, found little support among the 
Austrian German liberals, but they did find it among the 
Czech nationalists such as Palacky and his son-in-law, 
Ladislav Rieger, who later became the leader of the Old 
Czech Party. 
The Czech nationalists feared that the inclusion of 
Austria, with her array of non-Germans, in anything other 
than a confederation would result in the complete submersion 
of Czech rights in a German sea. 
... . 
Palacky and Rieger felt 
that so long as Germany remained un-unified, Austria could 
easily remain the presiding member. If Germany were to 
unite, however, whether under Frankfurt or Prussia, not only 
would German Austria be relegated to a lower level within 
the new body, but the Slavs would become a real minority 
whereas in Austria alone they actually represented the 
majority race (with Galicia and Slavonia attached). 
In the first Austrian parliament ever convened the 
Czech representatives placed themselves to the right of the 
Liberals who condemned them for not supporting the 
revolution. The Czech position, however, had more to do 
with survival as a viable national entity than being anti-
constitutional. 
The Czechs made up the strongest faction of the right. 
They were, however, politically committed to the liberal 
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constitution concepts of the revolutionary era. On the 
national question, however, they were vigorous opponents to 
the militant Germans and condemned Frankfurtism [2]. 
The Czech position vis-a-vis the German Liberal is best 
illlustrated by Palacky's refusal to sit at Frankfurt 
representing Bohemia. He responded by drafting a letter to 
the Frankfurt body explaining his belief in the necessity of 
maintaining the Austrian Empire as a great power and 
condemned the Liberal grossdeutsch idea of its destruction. 
A Bohemian-German named Hartmann attended in Palacky's stead 
and spoke at St. Paul's church, advocating militarily 
forcing Bohemia into "Germany" in order to protect Germans 
in the Sudeten areas [3). Representative Hartmann's 
utterances are not only prophetic, they also illustrate a 
nationalistic bent found in the German settled areas of 
Bohemia which later would develop into a radical nationalism 
found nowhere else in Austria. 
Not surprisingly, the parliamentary left was 
predominantly German and pro-Frankfurt. The Germans were 
also embued with anti-Slav sentiment [4]. 
The interest of the Crown was, of course, the 
territorial integrity of the Monarchy and the preservation 
of Austria as a great power. It had to ally itself with a 
strong faction in Parliament, but which one? The German 
Liberals, though fiercely nationalistic (considering Germans 
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the only Herrenvolk in Central Europe), were anti-Vienna, 
pro-grossdeutsch and in their radical wing advocated the 
Habsburg demise. The Center was moderate in its demands. 
It advocated a continued strong monarchy, but was simply too 
weak to hold any kind of majority in policy votes. A 
majority could only be achieved by aligning with the Slav 
right which served as an antidote to Frankfurtism [5]. 
Therefore, the Czechs found themselves in the role of 
uneasy champions of the very power that had usurped their 
royal dignity--the Habsburg Crown. Together the "King of 
Bohemia" and those who no longer had the right to elect him 
faced off the German Liberals. 
KREMSIER AND ETHNIC PARTITION 
Throughout the summer of 1848 the infant Austrian 
Parliament struggled. Little was accomplished, save the 
final emancipation of the peasants; and when fresh violence 
broke out in Vienna in October, Emperor Ferdinand decided to 
summon parliament's next session in the quieter atmosphere 
of the small episcopal Moravian town of Kremsier [6]. It 
was here that the first proposal for an ethno-territorial 
partition of Bohemia was made. 
In January 1849, a liberal constitution was drafted 
whose principal designer was the Czech delegation leader, 
Franticek Palacky, who proposed that Austria be divided into 
four groups, two of which were a German-Austrian and a 
Bohemian group. 
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The significance of this draft is that "[Palacky] would 
have been ready to accept the severance of 'German-Bohemia' 
from the Czech districts" [7]. Palacky was proposing a 
federation of nationalities, not territories. A later draft 
included Hungary but still held to the principle of national 
divisions as opposed to divisions along historical 
boundaries. He proposed instead of four " ••• eight 
federal groups: (1) German-Austria, including the Sudetian 
[sic] districts; (2) the Czech lands (Bohemia, Moravia, 
Silesia, together with Slovakia)" [8]. There was no reason, 
however, to believe that Hungary would ever hand over 
Slovakia. 
Unable to carry the drafting committee to a federalized 
national empire, Palacky returned to the only obvious 
alternative to national federalism--Staatsrecht. This 
principle of the indivisability of the three Crownlands 
within the "Historic Borders" of the Bohemian King Wenceslas 
became almost sacred to the Czech nationalists for the 
remainder of their struggle for statehood. Basically it 
stood in opposition to the principle of national self-
determintion and upheld the principle of historic rights. 
Thus, according to Staatsrecht, the Germans living in the 
Kronlander were first Bohemians, secondly Austrians, due to 
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the right of the Bohemian Staat to remain whole. 
As mentioned above, unable to carry the drafting 
committee to a federalized national empire which would have 
put each nationality on an equal footing, 
Palacky wavered between • • • the nationalist and 
the historic solution, a return to 'States' Rights' 
[historic] being for the Czechs the most obvious 
alternative to federalism. [9] 
The final draft was a necessary compromise between 
centralism " ••• proposed by most Germans, and federalism 
[either along ethnic or historic-traditional lines] as 
favored by most of the Slavic" [10]. 
Contrary to Palacky's proposal of the national 
partition of the Crownlands, the historic borders were to be 
left unchanged. However, mechanisms were proposed to 
address the national issue. 
The nationally mixed Crownlands [were to be] 
subdivided into homogeneous districts [Kreisel, 
whose representatives were [to be] added to the 
Crownland delegation in the upper chamber [in 
Vienna]. The traditional political entities were 
thus preserved, [historic Crownlands, Staatsrecht] 
• • • and yet a national organization • • • was 
provided. [11] 
In March 1849 the Austrian parliament at Kremsier was 
dissolved, and the constitution was never enacted. The new 
Emperor, Franz-Joseph, with the aid and under the influence 
of Prince Felix von Scharzenburg, had militarily gained the 
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upper hand and had no need to recognize a parliamentarian 
document. The constitution that was issued only slightly 
resembled that of Kremsier and was octroian in nature. The 
Kremsier constitution is not a dead letter, however. Within 
this document lies seeds of future struggles. 
The very rejection of Palacky's national federation 
scheme by the drafting committee marks the beginning of the 
Czech position of Staatsrecht. As mentioned above, this 
doctrine of the indivisibility of the Bohemian Crownlands 
within their historical borders became so entrenched in the 
minds of the Czech leaders that it sustained Czech national 
hopes until its final realization at the Paris Peace 
Conference of 1919. 
One also finds the embryo of future German-Bohemian 
demands in the creation of homogeneous Kreise within the 
historic borders. These groupings of single nationalities 
were German inventions which served to weaken the province 
and, thus, the very elements of a federalized Austria [12]. 
The last thing the Bohemian Germans wanted was a strong 
democratic Bohemia in an Austrian Federation. By creating 
semi-autonomous German areas within Bohemia (Kreise) , the 
Germans could maintain their German cultural character, 
privileged position and politically thwart the Czech notion 
of Staatsrecht (but more on that below) • 
Liberalism and nationalism both were strong forces 
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during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but there 
were others. Behind the political stage the dynamics of 
industrialization were beginning to have an impact upon 
Bohemians in general and upon the relations of Czech to 
German within the Crownlands in particular. To better 
understand the social and political consequences of the 
industrial revolution, a quick survey of Bohemia's unique 
geography is in order. 
THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION AND ITS SOCIAL IMPACT 
IN LIGHT OF GEOGRAPHY 
The ancient kingdom of the Bohemian Crownlands held an 
interior position within Europe. With the loss of Lusatia 
and most of Silesia to the Prussians in the eighteenth 
century, the Crownlands became even more centralized and 
individualized. "The role of the mountain girdle protects 
the individuality of the region which it encloses" [13]. 
The area resembles a basin--a relatively flat center 
with mountains enclosing it on three sides. Palacky 
referred to Bohemia as a Kessel or kettle, the breakup of 
which would render it no longer useful (obviously a post-
Kremsier reflection of Staatsrecht). As outlined above, the 
Germans settled in the enclosing mountains, while the Czechs 
inhabited the central basin. The Germans operated the 
mining industry, while the Czechs engaged in agriculture on 
some of Europe's most fertile land. The capacity of the 
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Czech central basins to produce food was matched only by the 
German-inhabited mountains' capacity to produce minerals. 
What is here important is that due to the very poor soil in 
the mountainous areas, the Germans were dependent upon the 
Czechs for food, while the needs of the Czechs for solid 
fuels, chemicals, and other minerals could only be satisfied 
by the Germans. 
Bohemia was a textbook example of economic 
interdependency between two nationalities. With the coming 
of the industrial revolution, it naturally fell to the 
German-inhabited mining areas to fill Bohemia's energy 
needs. The importance of the Randgebiet to modern Austria's 
economic well being rose sharply. 
In the first decades of the nineteenth century 
mining was still of little consequence to the 
economy. [In 1819] ••• annual production of coal 
was about 85,000 tons. Only with the introduction 
of the steam engine and • • • railroad did the need 
for solid fuels take off. (14] 
The railroad opened new industrial markets and was soon 
burning coal while hauling coal, which replaced wood in the 
homes. "By 1848 annual production was already 600,000 tons1 
seven years later that ••• tripled to 1.8 million tons 
annually" (15]. 
It is true that the Germans were not the only 
beneficiaries of the industrial revolution. The Continental 
System blockade of the Napoleonic period had given rise to 
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new industries everywhere to replace those goods previously 
imported to Central Europe. Most significant was the sugar 
beet industry that today still flourishes. One must 
remember, however, that though Czech entrepreneurs did 
exist, the great agricultural estates, Grossgrundbesitze, 
were often in the hands of those who had close ties to 
Vienna. 
Beyond that, processing and shipping of all produced 
goods, agricultural or otherwise, was invariably dependent 
upon solid fuels, mostly lignite from the German areas. 
• • . the consumption of • • • coal in Austria-
Hungary in 1875 [stands as] 15 percent by 
railroads, 55 percent in manufacturing, much in 
sugar beet refining, and 28 percent in crafts, 
services, and households. [16] 
It is true also that the largest lignite mines which 
lay in German Teplitz, Brilx, Falkenau and Komotau of North 
Bohemia did not match production of the anthracite mines of 
Czech Silesia until 1871. After that year, however, lignite 
became the leading coal mined. Indeed, lignite production 
by 1913 was only second to that of the world's leader--the 
German Reich [17]. 
It is worthy of mention that the Crownlands in general 
were highly favored by the Austrian government. "The 
Austrians, as a matter of policy, had tended to establish 
industries in the Czech lands rather than any other part of 
the Empire" (18] • 
Of the Empire in total, 
••. the main producer of lignite was Bohemia with 
83% followed by Styria with 12% ••• hard coal 
[anthracite] came from Silesia with 46% followed by 
Bohemia with 27% and Moravia with 14%. (19] 
The great significance of these figures is that in 
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1918, truncated Austria will find herself cut off from 85% 
of her coal sources, which shall have great social and 
political consequences, as we shall see. 
Though Bohemia's industrial boom was hardly unique in 
nineteenth century Europe, the fact that mining was 
virtually confined to the districts of one ethnic group was 
to have grave consequences for the ethno-social 
stratification of the Crownlands in general, but especially 
Bohemia, where industry was furthest developed. (Austrian 
Silesia was also highly developed industrially but the 
presence of a third, Polish group tended to neutralize 
ethnic discord.) 
Universally, the industrial revolution set certain 
trends in motion within society. One of these was the 
tendency for peasants from the countryside to flock to the 
new urban, industrial centers. In England, Germany and 
America, for example, this caused great hardships and social 
inequity. In Bohemia, this was further complicated by 
ethno-social division. 
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The migration of Czechs from the agricultural areas 
into the all-German areas eventually caused heated conflict 
which found its expression in a chauvinism practiced by 
Germans and Czechs alike. 
Early Czech migration or "immigration," as the Germans 
saw it, into German-Bohemia posed little problem, for 
assimilation was both expected and carried out. The Czech 
was simply "Germanized" within the factory town--a process 
not abhorrent to the Czechs themselves, for it had its 
obvious economic advantages. Besides that, the rather 
exaggerated nationalism of the German-Bohemians would have 
it no other way. Czech children would attend German 
schools; fathers would speak German on the job. Within a 
generation the Germanization process would be all but 
complete [20]. 
Moreover, the Czechs were welcome. 
From about 1860, German employers, especially in 
the lignite area of North Bohemia, were glad to 
take on Czech labour •••• It was cheaper (and due 
to a better diet) it was more virile and therefore 
more satisfactory for unskilled work. [21] 
The next decades, however, saw such an intensification 
of Czech migration into German areas that German workers 
were being displaced. The financial crisis of 1873 caused 
keen competition for jobs. Far from being welcomed, the 
Czechs were now despised and even blamed for the troubles. 
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German-Bohemian leaders, as a result, began calling for the 
"sealing off" of the German areas in order to prevent what 
they referred to as the "Czechif ication" of the pure German 
character of their Alldeutschgebiete. 
At this point it becomes necessary to understand a few 
basic concepts and to become familiar with certain terms. 
Convenience is served by referring to certain aspects of the 
Czech-German conflict as they were heard in the Reichsrat 
debates and the German press. 
The German-Bohemians regarded the Czech doctrine of 
Staatsrecht (the meaning of which was explained above) as 
outdated medieval claptrap. Not recognizing its principles, 
the Germans sought the subdivision of Bohemia, for there the 
conflict was most acute, into nationally homogeneous Kreise. 
Each Kreis, of which five or six would exist, was to be made 
up, as nearly as possible, of German-speaking Bezirke--
something akin to an electoral or judicial precinct or 
parish. Bohemia contained a total of 221 such bodies. 
The Czechs rejected the notion of partition, or 
Zweiteilung, for it sought to divide what the Czechs felt 
indivisible. They further felt that the Germans in Bohemia 
were simply fellow Bohemians regardless of who sat in 
Vienna. The Czechs also longed for a fair, democratic 
electoral system where their majority could set the seal on 
their destiny as again their own masters [22]. 
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POLITICAL BACKDROP 
The political picture in the Empire between 1848 and 
1900 can be characterized by the paradoxical definition of 
an ever-fluxing status quo. 
The nee-absolutism of the re-entrenched centralist 
forces remained intact from the Kremsier rejection until the 
death of Emperor Franz Joseph, whose reign matches those 
years exactly. This period is marked with one ministry 
after another in Vienna unable or unwilling to cope with the 
problems inherent in a multinational empire. 
A settlement amicable to all parties became impossible. 
Any solution which favored one side was seen by the other as 
purchased at a cost to them. 
To list all proposals and subsequent reactions would be 
too lengthy and of no practical purpose. Therefore, only 
those institutions which both endured and affected German-
Czech relations will be discussed. 
NEC-ABSOLUTISM 
Professor Dr. Oscar Jaszi defines the return to 
absolutism after 1848 in terms of the first decade's 
Minister of Interior, Alexander Bach. 
The 'systeme Bach' agreed with the system of 
Metternich on three substantial points: One ••• 
the Germanizing Centralization ••• The second 
• • . the extension of the former police and spy 
system. Third • • • the total surrender of the 
Empire to Catholicism and especially the Jesuits. 
[23] 
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Seton-Watson is more succinct. To him the Bach system 
" ••• rests upon four posts: 'the soldiers upright, the 
bureaucrats seated, the priests kneeling, the spies 
rampant'" [24]. 
Now the conservative Czech position toward the 
Schwarzenburg-Bach government in Vienna certainly was not 
one of blind support, but leaders such as Palacky and even 
less conservative factions led by Pinka and Rieger did see 
the re-emergence of the conservative monarchy as a bulwark 
against the real threat to Czech national and political 
aspirations--the German Liberals. "Palacki ••• did not 
express reaction to the neo-absolutists centralist regime of 
the fifties so much as reaction to the neo-liberal German 
centralism of the sixties" [25]. 
The Austro-German Liberals of the right advocated a 
Grossoesterreich, a centralized Viennese state, and rejected 
any notion of federalism, which the Czechs favored. The 
German Liberal of the left advocated a Grossdeutschland 
emanating from Frankfurt, rejected federalism on a 
historical border basis, and wished to lessen the Crown 
while strengthening the parliament. They represented the 
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future Social Democrats. 
The left's advocacy of a federalism based on ethnic 
instead of historic lines (not unlike Palacky at Kremsier) 
would seem at least consistent with some Czechs who would 
drop Staatsrecht for an equitable federalism--especially 
after the Battle of Windesgratz in 1866, which all but 
killed grossdeutsch hopes. Surely the Czechs would fare 
well within a federalism based on national entities simply 
by virtue of the Slav numbers within Cisleithania. And they 
would have, if anything close to a fair electoral system 
had existed--but it did not. 
Electoral Geometry 
The German Liberals came into power in the 1860's and 
brought with them the Schmerling Curial electoral system 
which served as an effective device to artificially give the 
Germans of Cisleithania the majority over the Slavs. It is 
imperative to understand the basic mechanisms of this system 
in order to fully comprehend its ultimate consequences once 
the Czech social position began to improve. 
The electorate was divided into four curiae, the great 
landowners or Grossgrundbesitzer, the chambers of commerce, 
the towns, and lastly, the peasants. Germans dominated the 
first three, the Czechs the fourth. 
Simply put, it took fewer votes from, say, the 
Grossgrundbesitzer Kurie to elect a favorite candidate, 
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usually one of its own, than a peasant to elect one of his. 
The higher the social status of the voter, the more the vote 
counted. Added to this was the restrictive franchise based 
on taxes which, of course, reflected incomes. The ten 
guilders franchise cut out vast numbers of Czech peasants. 
Practical examples of the Schmerling system are as 
follows: 
• • • in some districts deputies were elected by 
two or three votes, in others by more than ten 
thousand votes [and the ten guilder franchise] 
• • • was enough to give Vienna, which then had 
almost a million inhabitants, no more than 7,400 
e 1 igible voters. [ 26] 
For the purposes of this study, the elections of the 
Bohemian Diet in 1876 are especially revealing. 
To the Bohemian Diet [221 seats] the big landowners 
[a mere handful of people] could elect 70 
representatives, the chambers of commerce 15, the 
towns 72, the countryside 79. Thus the towns which 
were German or had a high proportion of Germans had 
a deputy to 11,600 inhabitants, while the country 
districts, predominantly Czech--had one to 49,081 
inhabitants. [27) 
In other words, it took five times more Czechs to elect a 
deputy to the Diet than it did Germans. 
It did not stop here. Until the eighties, only the 
provincial Diet in Prague, overwhelmingly German, could 
elect from its ranks the provincial representatives to 
Vienna. Of the thirty-nine Abgeordneten sent to the 
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Reich sr at from Bohemia, Palacky was the only Czech--and he 
abstained out of protest. "[It] was entirely possible for 
the administration to control elections arbitrarily and 
minutely" [28]. 
But there was a flaw in Schmerling's Wahlgeometrie. It 
could work to the Germans' advantage only if non-Germans 
remained at the lower end of the socio-economic scale. 
Indeed, a shift in the fortunes of the Czech populations 
could conceivably result in the Curia system actually 
working against its German designers--and that is exactly 
what happened. 
The Iron Ring Coalition 
The general amelioration of the Czech position in the 
three Crownlands was especially manifest in Bohemia. 
Indeed, Bohemia represented the social and political 
vanguard of the Slav world during the last decades of the 
nineteenth century. Any betterment of non-Germans was 
viewed with misgiving by those who had so long held an 
economic monopoly--especially in a world increasingly 
governed by market competition. 
In the second half of the century a Czech 
'bourgeoisie' [began to develop] apace to compete 
with the German employers and financiers who had 
hitherto extended their power without challenge. 
[29] 
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This was quite a new feature on the Bohemian landscape. 
This new breed was young, intelligent and upwardly mobile. 
Moreover, they well realized that in order to get their 
share they must play the game. They condemned their older 
colleagues' practice of parliamentary abstention. It was 
not because they lacked patriotism--indeed their brand of 
nationalism would soon overshadow that of their older 
countrymen. It was just that the "New Czechs" practiced a 
nationalism based on the hard sciences of economics and 
politics--not on romantic notions of ancient rights or 
indignant self-righteous indulgences such as parliamentary 
abstention. 
With the arrival of Count Edward Taaffe in 1879 the 
Czechs returned to Vienna. The Czech delegation was 
dominated by the "Old Czechs," now led by Ladislav Rieger, 
but within ten years the "Young Czechs" would become the 
political prime movers. 
The Taaffe Era signaled phenomenal changes within 
Cisleithania. Most important was the collapse of the German 
Liberal absolute majority, which would never again control 
parliament. 
The strength of Premier Taaffe's government was his 
creation of the so-called Iron Ring, a coalition of parties 
which stood in opposition to the German Liberals. The 
backbone of this coalition lay chiefly in the return of the 
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Czechs who, as mentioned above, were beginning to use the 
Curia system to their own advantage. 
Czech cooperation was purchased in basically three 
ways: First, the Crown, which would do almost anything to 
break the Liberal government, issued a series of Language 
Decrees in 1880 
enjoining the political, administrative, and 
judicial authorities to use the language of • 
parties involved. [Next] a new franchise was 
introduced for the Bohemian Diet [with the result 
that] in the powerful [Grossgrundbesitzer Kurie] 
the Czechs secured a considerable share of control 
••• and third, by Decree of April 4, 1881 the 
University of Prague was divided into two entirely 
distinct universities, one Czech, one German. [30] 
These three K.U.K. decrees were a great blow to the 
Germans. It may be said that they were struck socially, 
economically and culturally, in that order. 
The first decree is undoubtedly the most important, for 
language rights of the Czechs in the German districts meant 
that Germans would be forced to accommodate the ever-
migrating Czechs. These and later language laws will become 
the major bone of contention in the battle between 
Staatsrecht and Zweiteilung, as we shall see later. 
The second decree, that of a lower Grossgrundbesitzer 
Kurie franchise, allowed those Czechs involved in the strong 
chambers of commerce curia to advance to the even stronger 
great estates curia. But, one may ask, how did so many 
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Czechs get into the cities' commercial circles in the first 
place? 
In order to take part in the industrial revolution 
boom, financial banking was necessary. For the Czechs, 
this was provided by the first Bohemian bank not controlled 
by Vienna. The ~ivnostenka Banke, founded in 1868, greatly 
facilitated Czech industry and allowed many to enter 
stronger Chamber of Commerce curiae (31]. 
According to Alois Brusatti, the "Zivnosterka Banku pro 
Cechy a Moravu became possibly the most expressive symbol of 
the Czech minority economic emancipation movement" (32]. 
According to the Schmerling system, economic power and 
political power were inextricably tied, so that by 
• • • 1883 the Budweis Chamber of Commerce began to 
send only Czechs to the Reichsrat [direct 
parliament elections then possible], and there were 
tremendous [election] tussles among [Czech and 
German] businessmen in both Pilsen and Prague. 
(33] 
The Czechs had indeed learned well from the Germans the 
power of the marriage of political and economic power. What 
is more, the Germans were now no longer in a position to do 
anything about the situation in Parliament. 
The third decree, of course, had a great impact on the 
cultural pride of the Czech nation. It is of interest that 
Professor Dr. Thomas Masaryk was one of the first to be 
invited to teach at the new Czech university. 
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To review the last forty years of the nineteenth 
century, one sees the German hegemony in Austria re-
established by sham constitutionalism and lopsided rights. 
The industrial revolution offered opportunities to the 
Czechs who left the farm and were initially willing to 
assimilate in the German areas. By the seventies, a new, 
politically aware Czech bouregoisie was beginning to emerge. 
It recognized the need to challenge the German political and 
social monopoly if it was to find a place in the modern 
world. It did so by using the inequitable electoral system 
to its own advantage, as well as by developing financial 
independence from German Vienna. The timely arrival of 
Count Taaffe and the formation of an "anti-German-Liberal" 
coalition furthered the betterment of the Czechs vis-a-vis 
the Germans in Bohemia--and heightened tensions. Soon 
traditionally German-controlled cities such as Pilsen and 
Budweis returned Czechs only to the Reichsrat, and German 
fears for and opposition to the "Czechification" of their 
areas grew [34]. 
The Bohemian Germans were naturally alarmed. Their 
political power was waning. (Bohemia was a stronghold of 
the German Liberals of the most radical kind). Their 
devisive electoral system was backfiring, and worst of all 
the very German character of their mountainous "homelands" 
was being invaded. Incoming Czechs, far from assimilating, 
l 
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began using the new Taaffe Language Decrees to set up Czech 
"colonies" in German-Bohemia in a deliberate attempt to 
"take back" Bohemia from the Germans--a process many felt 
could only be stopped by the ethnic administrative partition 
of Bohemia. 
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CHAPTER III 
PARTITION OF BOHEMIA: ZWEITEILUNG OR STAATSRECHT 
GERMAN CHARACTER UNDER SIEGE 
As mentioned above, after the sixties and seventies 
Czechs moving into the German areas, whether German cities 
within the Czech portions of the country or the German-
occupied districts along Bohemia's outer edges, were no 
longer so willing to give up their national heritage as 
their predecessors had been. 
In the last decades of the century a Czech national 
consciousness led immigrating workers to demand "national 
equality" such as the use of the Czech language in public 
life and the establishment of Czech schools [1]. These 
rights, now guaranteed by the Language Laws of 1880 provided 
the need for educated Czechs who manned the schools and 
lesser bureaucrats who took posts in municipal 
administrations in order to guarantee those workers, 
cobblers, shopkeepers and teachers their legal access to the 
judicial and administrative rights the Czechs now possessed 
in Bohemia. Czechs were favored for such posts by the 
imperial officials due to their bilingual abilities. 
Of all the manifestations of the new order of things, 
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no one aspect caused so much concern to the Germans, 
especially in the north Bohemian mining areas, as the 
establishment of Czech elementary schools. Not only did it 
guarantee a Czech presence in the future of a given area, 
but the new Language Laws provided Czech nationalists with a 
tool which they skillfully used to promote the insidious 
Czech advance into German-Bohemia. 
Actually this tool had been on the books since the 1868 
Constitution of the Dual Monarchy but no provision was made 
for its execution, and it simply went unheeded. The Taaffe 
Laws and the political climate of the 1880's, however, put 
some teeth into the law. 
Article XIX of the Constitution specified that each 
Bezirk was responsible for the education of its minorities. 
Further it specified that if forty or more children of a 
particular nationality lived within a one-half mile radius, 
the local authority must provide them with a school taught 
in their language. 
The Czech School Union [2], founded in 1880, would 
organize Czech families together in order to reach the 
qualifying forty children. If unable to assemble forty, the 
Union would organize a private Czech School, often financed 
by the Zivnostenka Banke, until forty could be gathered. 
Once they qualified, the municipal authorities were then 
obligated to take over the funding of the school, releasing 
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the private funds to be used elsewhere in another German 
town to start the whole process over again [3]. 
This is not to say that every Czech family was a 
standard-bearer of Czech nationalism. Their primary reason 
for settling in the German areas was economical, their 
primary goal: security for their family. It was chiefly 
the various Czech and German nationalist "societies" that 
fanned the fires of conflict. 
In addition to the School Unions, the German 
Sportvereine and the Czech Sokols (falcons) represented 
organized outdoor activities for young men and women. They 
bordered on the para-military in content and attempted to 
embue their respective members with a super-nationalism not 
unlike what one will later see in the Hitler-Jugend. The 
Sokols were banned in 1915 by Austrian military authorities, 
and after the Czechoslovak State was proclaimed in 1918 they 
re-emerged and served as a militia in the early days of the 
Czechoslovak occupation of German-Bohemia. 
There also arose a network of so-called defense leagues 
from both sides which were based on racial ill will [4]. 
If the education laws of Article XIX were the tool, it 
was the Language Decrees of 1880 which provided the muscle 
to apply that tool. German opposition to the Decrees was 
not merely based on their ill effects regarding Czech 
expansion; it went much deeper. The language issue in 
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Bohemia was based on the conflict between the two 
nationalities' divergent concepts of the relation between 
language and the territory inhabited by those who speak it. 
First one must distinguish between the two concepts: 
the language of the land or country--Landessprache--and the 
language customary in the land--Landesubliche Sprache. 
Landessprache was any language spoken by 20% of the 
inhabitants, in this case, Bohemia. Both Czech and German 
qualified, as approximately 40% of the Bohemian population 
used German as its first and mother tongue. Landesubliche 
Sprache was to the Germans in Bohemia and Moravia the 
customary language prevalent in any given district [5]. 
Robert Kann outlined the two positions this way: 
The Czechs held that no distinction existed between 
the two concepts in the Crownlands. The Germans 
stressed the importance of the distinction • • • • 
The Czechs demanded that the Czech language should 
on historical grounds be the only official language 
throughout the two Crownlands, even in German 
districts. The Germans ••• held that the 
official language should be only the one customary 
in any given district--in the German districts, 
German. [6] 
The Czechs' demand for their own language to be the only 
official language is consistent with Staatsrecht and even 
national self-determination, for they considered Bohemia to 
be their nation--one nation, one national language 
determined by the one national majority. 
But here the Gleichberechtigung, or equality of both 
,-----
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languages bode just as ill for the Germans as it would have 
had Czech indeed been the only official language. Unable to 
gain recognition of the landesubliche Sprache, i.e., German, 
as the only official language of their all-German areas, the 
Germans began promoting the administrative separation of 
Bohemia into a Czech and German part [7]. Such a 
separation, they felt, would stem Czech expansion and 
thereby render the Language Decrees of 1880 useless. 
Time was of the essence for the Germans, for the so-
called pure German character in many areas by 1880 already 
had ceased to exist. It became apparent that if German 
Kreise were to be established and sealed off from the 
Czechs, it must be done as soon as possible. "It is 
estimated that between 1880 and 1900 half a million Czechs 
migrated to areas that had been 80% German" [8]. And there 
was little indication of this letting up. (See Appendix, 
Map 2.) 
POLITICAL PARTIES AND PROGRAMS 
The arrival of Prime Minister Taaffe's Iron Ring 
coalition sounded the death knell of the Austrian German-
Liberals. For years there had been bickering within their 
ranks chiefly due to divergent opinions as to how they 
should deal with the rearrangements of society caused by the 
industrial revolution. 
From the Old Liberals, three "socialisms" emerged: 
National Socialism, Christian Socialism and the Social 
Democrats. 
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The Christian Socialists fit somewhere between the 
conservatism of the church hierarchy and liberal society, a 
large area indeed. Their active voice was Karl Lueger 
(1844-1910), who attempted to address the economic 
grivenaces of the lower bourgeoisie against business and 
industry [9]. 
The Christian Socialists were center-oriented and were 
condemned by the nationalist parties for being too "Slav 
friendly" in their attempt to address the nationality 
problem. They, as did the Emperor, eventually became 
arbiters in the general search for a Bohemian settlement. 
The Social Democrats made their first appearance in 
1869 as a manifestation of growing industry. It was not 
until 1889, however, that they had any real power, for it 
was only then that they were allowed to meet legally once 
the so-called "Anarchy Laws" were dropped [10). 
The early leader of the party was Victor Adler, future 
Foreign Minister of the First Austrian Republic. His 
position regarding the Czech-German conflict in Bohemia was 
simple and reflected the Socialist Weltanschauung in 
general: The conflict was a social class conflict and not 
national. The Social Democrats were "international" as 
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opposed to "national" and thus proposed that no national 
privileges be accorded anyone. 
The doctrine of the Austrian SDP, chiefly the work of 
Otto Bauer, Karl Renner and Adler, was consistent with that 
of Marx and especially of Engels, who labelled the Germans 
as the vanguard in the Socialist struggle in central Europe 
and as a bulwark against "Pan-Slavism" from Russia [11). 
The Social Democrats did not see eye-to-eye with the 
Christian Socialists. They were, after all, vying for the 
hearts and minds of the newly-enfranchised lower-middle 
class. However, there was some room for compromise and 
maneuvering between the two parties. There was no room at 
all between the Social Democrats and the third major 
political entity to emerge from the German Liberals in late 
nineteenth-century Austria--the National Socialists. 
The Nationalists represented what in modern jargon 
would be considered the right, but not the conservative 
right. That was the territory of the Christian Socialists, 
which embraced clerical and moderate monarchist views. The 
National Socialists have been referred to as the "Anti-" 
party. They were anti-Habsburg (the old Liberal 
grossdeutsch proponents had found refuge within their 
ranks); and anti-Jewish, a characteristic they shared with 
the Christian Socialists but not with the Social Democrats, 
who had largely a Jewish leadership [12). 
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The founder and leader of the National Socialists was 
one Georg Schonerer, whom his detractors referred to as 
Ritter Georg, an allusion to St. George the Dragonslayer. 
He, as did many nationalist leaders, hailed from the Eger 
District of German-Bohemia, where the radical National 
Socialists drew their strongest support and anti-Czech 
feelings were highest. His followers were " • . • those 
Germans whose economic position was most directly threatened 
by the Czech migration" [13]. These included not only those 
in the mining areas of the German Randgbiet, but often the 
middle classes in the cities as well. 
Many were disappointed with the internationalism of the 
Austrian Social Democrats. To the displaced German worker, 
shopkeeper or bureaucrat the facts were before him: the 
Czechs were not their international brethren, they were 
their national adversaries. The radical arm of the 
Nationalists wasted no effort in fanning the fires of this 
national antagonism. 
There were many factions amongst the Nationalists, as 
among the other parties. Schonerer, Herman Wolf and others 
represented the radicals who soon formed their own 
association. In 1885 these radicals formed the extremely 
nationalistic anti-Jewish Verband der Deutschnationalen, 
which would win them the admiration of Hitler [14]. 
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THE LINZ PROGRAM 
The first officially articulated plan since Kremsier to 
address the nationality question was the Linz Program. It 
became the program of Schonerer's pan-Germans in 1895 but 
only twelve years after its inception. Actually, it was the 
straw that broke the back of the Liberals and marked their 
final dispersal in 1883. Its authors include none other 
than Victor Adler and Georg Schonerer, an unlikely 
cooperation, but one which well displays the kneejerk 
reaction of all German parties to the sudden ascendancy of 
the Czechs during the Taaffe ministry. 
The plan " ••• advocated the transfer to Hungary, or 
to an autonomous Galicia, [of] ••. all Slavs other than 
Czechs and Slovenes to make Austria a more German state" 
[15). German again was to become the only official language 
throughout the truncated Austria. Closer ties with the 
German Reich were encouraged. (The Dual Alliance had by 1883 
been in effect three years.) 
The Linz Group (Schonerer, Adler, Heinrich Friedjung, 
Adolf Fishhof) proposed to restore to Austria. 
There was a definite grossdeutsch hue to the Linz 
Program. The idea was to "Germanize" (or re-Germanize) 
Austria and promote closer ties to her German cousins to the 
west. 
The reasons have as much to do with arithmetic than 
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with common culture, however. With the franchise 
restrictions moving down and the voting power of the Czechs 
moving up, the spectre of Austro-Slavism was beginning to 
take on substance. 
The democratic forces within Cisleithania, especially 
the Socialists, had always promoted electoral reforms in the 
direction of an eventual universal sufferage. This, of 
course, would render the Slavs the most powerful race in the 
Empire due to their real numbers, but not if the Germans 
could effect the severance of nine million Slavs living in 
Dalmatia, Galizia, Bukovina, Bosnia and Herzegovina. With 
the loss of the non-German excess baggage, the Germans could 
replace the backfiring curia system with a fair electoral 
process with no fear. 
The loss of nine million sister Slavs and the 
reaffirmation of German centralism and the German language 
was, of course, condemned by the Czechs [17]. 
The significance of the Linz Program is three-fold. It 
clearly shows that the ethnic concerns outweighed the 
political. That is to say, the commonality of Germanism, 
regardless of political leanings, produced this rather 
drastic solution to what was collectively perceived as a 
Slavic challenge to the leading German position within the 
Empire. It also marks the final break of the republican 
side of the Austro-German Liberals. The Social Democrats 
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would pursue an internationalism couched, however, in the 
firm belief of the German mission, and the National 
Socialists would take on a pan-Germanism of the most 
chauvinistic hues and eventually adopt the Linz Plan, which 
was neither Zweiteilung- nor Staatsrecht-oriented, as their 
basic platform. 
Most German nationalist parties balked at Schonerer 
and his extremists. The moderate nationalists, Christian 
Socialists and Social Democrats eventually disowned 
Schonerer and collectively pursue various varieties of the 
Zweiteilung approach. 
The most significant element of the Linz Plan was that 
it " ••• confirmed [for the Czechs] the wisdom of becoming 
members of a majority in Vienna sufficiently powerful to 
prevent it from being put into practice" [18]. 
The Czechs of course were not in a position to call all 
the shots in Vienna, but they were able to prevent anyone 
else from doing so. This policy of Czech obstructionism 
will endure until 1918 and will render parliamentary 
legislation on the nationality question virtually 
impossible. 
1890 SPRACHENVERORDNUNEN 
In 1890 a provisional Bohemian settlement was reached 
between Taaffe, the Crown and the Old Czechs. The 1890 
i 
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Language Decrees called for " ••• the duplication of 
administrative machinery in Bohemia in both languages, and 
for minority rights in the schools" [19]. 
Ten years earlier this would have been no small triumph 
for the Czechs, but by 1890 the Old Czechs' seats in 
Austria's Parliament were diminished by the New Czechs who 
were much less conciliatory than their colleagues. Indeed, 
the intransigence of the New Czechs had prevented them from 
even being invited to negotiations leading to the 1890 
settlement. 
The Young Czechs repudiated the settlement as nothing 
less than Zweiteilung and condemned the Old Czechs for their 
willingness to abandon Staatsrecht and the doctrine of Czech 
being the only official Bohemian language. 
One sees the beginnings of each nationality containing 
two like elements. The Old Czechs, though waning in power, 
and the moderate Germans were able to at least negotiate and 
compromise. The New Czechs, like the National Socialists, 
were unshakable, and both respectively promoted the 
Czechif ication and Germanization of Bohemia. 
After 1890 the Crown " ••• gave up the idea of 
reconciliation with Bohemia and may be said to have remained 
at least latently anti-Czech for the remainder of his reign" 
[ 201 • 
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BADENI-SPRACHENVERORDNUNGEN 
Taaffe's fall in 1893 was followed by two years of rule 
by Grands Seigneurs. In 1895 Franz Joseph appointed Count 
Casimir Badeni to the Premiership in an atmosphere of 
intense national conflict within the Empire. 
Badeni, as those before him and those who followed, was 
charged by the Crown to finally settle the national problem 
lest the Empire collapse. Badeni, as those before him, then 
offered, or rather issued, his proposal. "Count Badeni, by 
his Language Ordinances of April 1897, for both Bohemia and 
Moravia, unloosed the greatest storm in modern Austrian 
politics" [21]. 
Years of bitter demonstrations followed. Never was any 
law so universally despised. Clashes in Prague and 
especially in Egerland between German and Czech were only 
controlled by constantly calling out the police. "In the 
notorious 'Baden times' [Badeni Zeiten] civil war was 
perhaps only narrowly averted" [22]. 
The most amazing aspect of the whole situation is that 
the ordinances themselves were anything but radical. Indeed, 
the greater portion of them had been on the books for over 
twenty years [23]. There was a new twist, however. Badeni 
inserted within the decree a mechanism insuring its 
enforcement, and this angered German-Bohemians greatly. 
Article II dealt with the language qualifications of 
officials. Section I states: 
Officials of the Justice and State Administrations 
as well as Ministers of the Interior [Police], 
Finance, Commerce and Agriculture placed after June 
1, 1905 must prove written and spoken knowledge of 
both languages. (24] 
To most Czech officials this meant little, for 
virtually all were bilingual; to the German officials, 
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however, this was seen as an outrage. It was one thing to 
provide a translator for a Czech subject in a court of law, 
for example. It was quite another that all the court 
officials should learn Czech in order to take their posts--
especially in areas totally devoid of Czech inhabitants. 
Needless to say this boded well for Czechs seeking a career 
in the civil service. 
The law was equally unpopular with the Young Czechs 
around whom the nation had begun to rally and who, by 1898, 
numbered more in both the Reicharat and the Bohemian Diet 
than did the Old Czechs. 
By 1900 neither accepted the notion of equal rights 
within the Crownland borders. The Germans, with good 
reason, feared that Czechs would use the decree to further 
encroach into German area. The only way the Germans would 
accept a Gleichberechtingung was by territorial partition. 
The Czechs feared that the parity of the languages 
would have a centrifugal effect on Bohemia and hinder the 
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rebirth of the Bohemian State. The recognition of two 
languages so clearly occupying their own respective areas 
was seen by many Czechs as the logical precondition to the 
dreaded Zweiteilung of Bohemia. 
Both nations challenged the legality of the laws due to 
their octroial nature and refused to observe any ruling not 
a product of parliamentary legislation. 
Dr. Seton-Watson described the scene in the Parliament: 
The result was frantic ••• obstructionism in the 
Reichsrat. Racial friction degenerated into 
fisticuffs on the floor of the House, and there was 
keen competition in catcalls and inkpot-throwing. 
[25] 
Badeni's ordinances were quickly rescinded, though the 
"times" bearing his name lasted years. In 1898 he and his 
government fell, to be replaced by Baron Gautsch whose milder 
language ordinances satisfied no one and were likewise 
withdrawn. The business of Government had come to a virtual 
standstill. "All serious business had become impossible [in 
Parliament] , and government could only be continued by the 
constant use of Paragraph Fourteen [imperial decree]" [26], 
by an embittered and aging Franz Joseph. 
It was in this atmosphere that deputies from all German 
parties, except Sch6nerers' "Linzers," began to grasp 
Zweiteilung as their only hope to maintain the cultural 
integrity of Deutschboehmen, while the Czechs became deeper 
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entrenched in the Staatsrecht idea. 
The National Socialists and the Badeni-Crown having 
tried and failed, it was now turn for the somewhat more 
conciliatory groups to try their hand at breaking the 
deadlock. 
THE BRUNN PROGRAM 
In light of the situation mentioned above, Socialist 
leaders felt that a common German political front was 
necessary if a solution was to be found to the Empire's 
nationality problems. 
Meeting at Brunn in 1899 the Social Democrats drafted a 
resolution aimed at findng a compromise with the various 
Socialist factions in Austria [27]. 
The Austrian Social Democrats as well as the Christian 
Socialists and National Socialists however never wavered 
from the idea of the German Herrenvolk in Central Europe 
[ 2 8] • 
Adolf Fishhof, one of the principal drafters of the 
Brunn Program, " ••• consistently urged the maintenance of 
this German leadership through the preservation of the 
Empire ••• " [29]. He went on to say, however, that 
concessions to non-Germans must be made in order to 
strengthen that leadership [30]. 
Fishhof, Karl Kavski, Friederich Austerlitz and others 
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saw the whole national struggle in the Marxist doctrinaire 
view of 
• • • serving the interests of the ruling class in 
an attempt to hinder social progress. [Thus] • • • 
the regulating of the nationality question within 
an equal rights framework was in the best interest 
of the advancement of the proletarian culture. [31] 
The Brunn Program, therefore, was the establishment of 
equal national entities in a democratic federation of 
nations. 
Points 2, 3, and 4 of the final draft give its basic 
character: 
2. In place of historic crownlands ••• 
ethnically determined autonomous bodies should be 
created. Their legislative and administrative 
agencies • • • elected by national chambers on the 
basis of general, equal and direct franchise. 
3. All autonomous territories of one nationality 
should combine to form a nationally homogeneous 
association, which should have complete self-
administration in national affairs. 
4. The rights of national minorities should be 
protected by a separate law to be passed by central 
parliament. [ 3 2] 
Point 5 deals with the temporary designation of German 
as the language of mediation, but even the most conciliatory 
Czech saw the danger and rejected it. 
The Brunn Program was a scheme for solving the national 
problems through a complicated system of cultural autonomy 
based not on territorial units, but on the communities of 
55 
languages. It was designed to fit the intermingling and 
overlapping of nations and languages within the Empire, 
especially Bohemia and Moravia. 
Simply put it was Zweiteilung, something the Czechs 
would not have, but it goes even deeper than that. Point 2 
explains the complete rejection of politico-historical 
borders, the very soul of Czech demands. Not only in 
Bohemia but throughout the empire the marriage of people to 
traditional boundaries was too strong to be dissolved. 
Point 4 was rather open-ended and did not really 
address the issue of the mixed areas where social tension 
was highest. 
If the Brunn Program seems revolutionary yet familiar, 
it is because it is virtually identical to Palacky's 
proposal at Kremsier during the Revolution of 1848-9. 
It is noteworthy that the concept of "Austria" has endured. 
From Palacky to most Czechs in Parliament in 1918 the belief 
in a strong cohesive empire persisted. 
The Social Democrats' proposal was little more than an 
official articulation of German concern over Czech expansion 
couched in the dogma of Marxism and emotional nationalism. 
Clearly the "autonomous territories of one nationality" were 
collections of Bezirke to form Kreise, and the "national 
homogeneous association" refers to the collection of five 
or six Kreise which would form the autonomous territory of 
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German-Bohemia comprising nearly half of the entire Bohemian 
territory and population. 
[The] historical significance [of Brunn] lies in 
its symptomatic content. It shows just how deep 
opposition [to Staatsrecht] had gone [on the German 
side] and how far Czech nationalism had seeped into 
all levels of Czech Society so that any compromise 
(between Czech and German] became less and less 
likely. [33] 
The idea of an empire of nationalities replacing 
nations was indeed revolutionary, perhaps too much so [34]. 
The inability to recognize that the Czechs were not the only 
ones to place a premium on historic borders within the 
Empire is reflected by the universal rejection of the Brunn 
Program in 1900. It also caused a rift among German and 
Czech members of the so-called "international" Austrian 
Social Democrats that would result in the creation of a 
Czech Social Democratic Party five years later which would 
reject Brunn and uphold Staatsrecht. 
It is to the Brunn Program's credit, however, that 
though it was rejected, most German parties embraced many of 
its integral principals in their own programs. The cry for 
national self-determination amongst the German-Bohemians 
was, of course, the most obvious. 
THE WHITSUNTIDE PROGRAM 
This program appeared on the scene in June 1899, just 
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about the same time as did the Brunn Program. Neither 
anticipated the other, but both articulated the prevailing 
moods of turn of the century Austria. 
This program was the product of the so-called German 
opposition parties in Parliament and included the German 
People's Party, German Progressive Party, Union of 
Constitutional Landowners, Christian Social Union and the 
Free-German Union. Whitsuntide reflected the German 
nationalism of the more radical Linz Program insomuch as it 
too advocated the severance of the excess Slavic baggage of 
Galicea, Herzegovina, etc. in order to give Germans a 
numerical preeminance in Cisleithania. Although far from 
advocating an Anschluss with the German Reich, it did praise 
the already twenty year-old alliance with Germany and 
promoted even closer ties in education and commerce [35]. 
With regard to the non-German population of the Empire, 
the Whitsuntide Program was much more conciliatory than 
Linz. Indeed, the Linz Program wished simply to swallow up 
the non-Germans, while the Whitsuntide group advocated 
extending equal rights to all nationalities--but only after 
the administrative separation from one another, a kind of 
separate but equal approach. This, of course, reflects the 
attitude embraced at Brunn but without the universally 
condemned notion of the dissolution of all historic borders. 
In short, Whitsuntide advocated the maintenance of the 
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old Crownland borders (as per Staatsrecht) with national 
Abgrenzung, or delimitations, within them. 
The programs' general demands regarding Bohemia are 
outlined as follows: 
III. Special Fundamental Laws for Individual 
Countries. 
B. Bohemia. 
1. National Delimitation. The national 
[ethnographic] delimitations of the Bezirke which 
will emanate from the towns is to be carried out. 
Bezirke are to contain only villages and towns of 
one and the same nationality. The delimited 
Bezirke shall be the building blocks of nationally 
separated administrative areas [Kreisel which shall 
have their own electoral precincts [Wahlgezirke, 
usually comprised of three or four Bezirke] for the 
Bohemian Diet, Imperial Parliament and other 
representative bodies. 
The delimitation of the German and Czech 
parts of Bohemia ••• will result in each living 
within their own Stamm, or core areas. [36] 
The Whitsuntide Program also touched upon the most 
sensitive areas of German-Czech conflict: "In mixed areas, 
whether Gemeinde [community], Bezirk or Kreis, both 
languages have parity [and] ••• in all mixed areas schools 
for minorities are to be built" [37] • 
On the surface the Whitsuntide Program does not seem 
wholly unfair. It was, of course, a defensive tactic 
against the "Czechification" of German Bohemian territory, 
but it was ready to recognize the Czechs as equal partners 
in their common homeland. It would seem that any Czech 
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rejection of such a plan would reveal the true identity of 
the Czech national aspirations--not equality but dominance 
in Bohemia. Many saw Whitsuntide as an olive branch held 
out to the Czechs, the rejection of which would render the 
conciliatory Germans as the unjustly injured party. The 
truth, however, is that the program of the German opposition 
was anything but fair. Interwoven in its content were its 
selfish motives and its undiminished racial chauvinism. 
The main problem revolved around the mixed areas--not 
the individual rights within them, but exactly which areas 
were to be considered mixed. The following exposes a rank 
double standard employed by the Germans in their designation 
of the national character of a given area. 
In the German mining towns where many Czechs worked, 
the entire family would be counted as "German" due to a 
system of census-taking that endured until the last Austrian 
census of 1910. People were counted and nationally 
designated according to their language of everyday use or 
Umgangssprache. If a Czech was employed at a German firm 
he, of course, would speak German on the job and thus was 
counted as a German. Subsequently, as head of the 
household, his entire family would be entered on the census 
rolls as Germans regardless of their origin or what language 
they spoke at home. Many Czechs argued that instead of the 
Umgangssprache, the hearth language or the language spoken 
60 
at home, should be the method of determining nationality, 
but the Germans would have no part of it [38]. 
The inverse of this practice is displayed in number 
three of the Special Laws for Bohemia in the Whitsuntide 
Program: "In mixed areas, such as the Capital at Prague, a 
parity of both languages shall exist" [39]. The mention of 
Prague was no random example. "Most Germans believed they 
had a legitimate claim to Prague and refused to make any 
concessions to the Czechs who demanded the denial of such a 
claim" [40]. Some Germans explained the claim as being 
consistent with Staatsrecht and felt that the common capital 
would help to maintain the unity of Bohemia. Few Czechs 
were willing to believe that was their intention. 
Though the Germans still held control of the Bohemian 
Diet in Prague--if only by obstructionism--they really 
represented a mere 5% of the capital's 202,000 citizens in 
1900 [41]. Beyond that, nearly 40% of those were Jews 
claiming German nationality [42]. (Jews were obliged to 
claim either Czech or German nationality.) Many such 
Jewish-Germans were prominant bankers and newspapermen and 
actually disclaimed as Germans by German nationalists. 
There were proportionately many more Czechs in Vienna than 
Germans in Prague. The Germans were in effect manipulating 
demographics to their own advantage. They were 
exaggerating their presence in Prague, while often unwilling 
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to even acknowledge the Czech presence in predominately 
German areas. 
In this light the Whitsuntide Plan is revealed as a 
product of the Herrenvolk concept. The Germans sought the 
dual advantage of maintaining the national character of the 
German areas and at the same time remaining at the helm of 
the Bohemian political ship of state. The idea of the 
Germans claiming two-fifths of Bohemia and parity in what 
one would assume would be the Czech capital was, of course, 
abhorrant to the Czechs--even to the last vestiges of the 
more conciliary Old Czechs. 
The government, though unwilling to meet the demand of 
Zweiteilung, did reveal a growing tendency to accommodate the 
Germans over the radicalizing Czechs, which lasted until 
World War I. 
[In] 1899, the aggressive German national 
Whitsuntide program was issued, and the new Clary 
cabinet obligingly met its demands to the extent of 
restoring the language regulations as they had 
existed [in] ••• 1880. [43) 
THE KORBER PLAN 
The last attempt before the war to reach an accord in 
Bohemia was presented by Premier Ernst von Korber in 1903. 
Korber enjoyed respect from both sides of the aisle in the 
Reichsrat. Under his premiership from 1900 to 1904 there 
was renewed confidence in the machinery of Parliament. The 
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excessive use of Paragraph 14 was curtailed; social reforms 
were initiated, and new commercial agreements with Hungary 
were made which Korber's predecessors had failed to procure. 
Dr. Seton-Watson refers to Korber as " ••• the most 
remarkable of Austria's modern Premiers, indeed almost the 
only one of outstanding merit" [44). 
But, alas, relations between Czech and German leaders 
had by this time deteriorated to such a degree that even a 
government in such capable hands failed to dislodge the 
intense intransigence now exercised by Germans and Czechs 
alike. 
What Korber proposed was not Zweiteilung but 
Dreiteitung. He attempted to isolate the mixed areas, that 
is, those areas where the general Czech population 
geographically met the general German population. Korber 
hoped that by removing the mixed areas from both Czech and 
German spheres much tension between the two nationalities 
could be avoided. This third part of Bohemia would then be 
self-governing under the auspices of Vienna. 
The Korber Program was not unlike the Whitsuntide 
program in its mechanics, the third division 
notwithstanding, but it did not carry with it the stridently 
pro-German attitude of the latter which actually included on 
the issued draft its own necessity as: "Due to the 
systematic repression and the ever increasing threat to the 
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German race in Austria ••• " [45]. Korber's plan was based 
on simply reaching a settlement between the two 
nationalities, not the defense of one against the threat of 
another, as was embodied in former proposals. 
The Plan was as good as any other. As a matter of 
fact, it was still a viable consideration in 1914. But to 
merely separate the nationally mixed areas from the 
basically homogeneous areas did not eliminate strife, only 
isolated it. Just as no one could agree where the ethnic 
borders should be between the Czechs and Germans in the 
Zweiteilung form, no one could agree where they should be 
drawn between, say, German and mixed. 
Had the borders actually been fixed, one could assume 
that the mixed areas themselves would merely have become 
microcosms of the conflict in general. 
THE MORAVIAN COMPROMISE 
The one single success in pre-War Cisleithania was a 
settlement in Bohemia's sister Crownland, Moravia. The 
Moravian Compromise of 1906 was the result of simply 
allowing both nationalities their own fixed seats in the 
Diet at Brunn. A citizen voted according to his registered 
nationality. A German could only vote for a German to take 
a German seat; likewise a Czech. The fixed number of Diet 
seats for each nationality resulted in eliminating 
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competition between the latter. The system was hardly a 
paradigm of democracy, however. The settlement greatly 
favored the Germans who represented only 28% of the 
population of Moravia in 1900 [46]. 
The Crownland Diet at Brunn sat a ratio of 73 Czechs to 
40 Germans--grossly out of proportion to the population. 
The curia system survived based on the old estates system. 
The town Curia was equally divided, but in the country Curia 
(Grossgrundbesitzern) the Germans held about half the seats, 
although the actual population was 90% Czech [47]. A fifth 
universal suffrage Curia was added based on nationality, 
but it could elect only twenty of the 151 seats at Brunn. 
The fact that the so-called "Personal System" 
functioned with little difficulty for ten years shows more 
the glaring difference between Moravia and Bohemia than it 
does any merit in the system itself. Such a system as 
employed in Moravia could never have worked in Bohemia, for 
the historic national tarditions in Moravia were not as 
strong as those in Bohemia. Moravia had preserved her 
clerical conservative tenant-landlord ties and remained 
almost fuedal in character [48]. 
Therefore, the feudal landlord-tenant relationship 
endured in Moravia; it embraced an often clerical 
conservatism and spurned the nationalist intelligencia which 
was so successful in Moravia's more cosmopolitan sister to 
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the west. 
It was, however, a settlement--something achieved 
precious seldom in pre-War Austria. It is to its credit 
that the "Personal System" was extended to Bukovina in 1910 
where, as in Moravia, it lasted until the collapse of the 
empire. 
Naturally the Crown was pleased; the Germans in Moravia 
were pleased but the Czech nationalist leaders, such as Dr. 
Karel Kramar, leader of the Young Czechs, were highly 
disturbed. Not only was Moravia going her own way by 
refuting the sacred solidarity of the indivisibility of the 
Crownlands but internally she had willingly put herself in 
the pocket of the ruling Germans under the thinnest of 
democratic pretexts. 
GERMAN-CZECH POLITICAL POSITION BEFORE 1914 
The first decade of the twentieth century saw a 
settlement in Moravia, the abolition of the Curia system for 
both houses of Parliament (although the Curia remained at 
the Diet level), followed by the introduction of universal 
manhood suffrage in time for the 1907 elections, though real 
strength remained with the Crown. 
The elections returned the German Social Democrats as 
the single largest party in Parliament but without an 
absolute majority, thus rendering Parliament still dependent 
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upon coalitions to get anything through. 
The Union of the Czechs now held more seats than the 
German Nationalist Union (Whitsuntide advocates). The 
Christian Socialists absorbed the Clerics to become the 
largest group, holding 94 seats. But the Socialists who 
alone held 84 had in one year jumped from only ten. The Old 
Feudal Landlord Constitutionalists Conservatives' Union 
(signators to Whitsuntide) disappeared entirely. 
The new Parliament realigned within itself in an 
attempt to adapt to the new centers of political power. 
Consequently there were divisions among divisions, which 
represented every political hue. "In total there were 28 
factions, a truly representative picture of the national and 
political diversity in current Cisleithania" [49]. 
There then began a spirit of mutual cooperation between 
Slavs who, now that the Curias were dissolved, were the most 
numerous race in Parliament. The solidarity of all Slavs in 
Vienna was, on the whole, ineffective. One must remember 
that the Crown still was in ultimate control. 
• • • though there [now] was a democratic 
parliament, there was no parliamentary government. 
The ministers received their posts from and were 
instructed by the Crown and were not responsible to 
Parliament. [50] 
Though Parliament was radically democratized, it was still 
as weak as ever before the Crown. 
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The elections of 1911, the last of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire, again returned the Socialists as the largest single 
party. Due to a return to pessimism brought on by the 
universal disapproval of the continued ineffectiveness of 
government regarding the nationality problems, the German 
political middle collapsed and split its alliance between 
the Nationalist Socialists and the Social Democrats, causing 
a polarization of power in Austrian politics in general. 
The Czechs abandoned the Germansim of the Austrian 
Social Democrats in 1905 and formed their own party which 
rejected the Zweiteilung of Brunn and joined in the all-
Czech ranks of Staatsrecht. The Czech political parties 
came under the leadership of Thomas G. Masaryk, who founded 
the Realist Party in 1900, and Karel Kramar, who headed up 
the Young Czechs. 
Masaryk spurned the overtly racial overtones of 
"Slavism" and instead embraced the Western rationalist 
philosophies of Locke and Hume. He saw for the future Czech 
state a kind of liberal democracy along the lines of that in 
the United States. Masaryk and his closest collaborator and 
student Eduard Benes were to be the first among the few who 
visualized a Czechoslovakia completely independent of 
Vienna. One must remember that those who longed for the 
resurrection of a Czech state never considered that it would 
not belong to an Austrian federation centered in Vienna. 
l 
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Masaryk's Realist Party never returned more than three seats 
in the Reichsrat [51]. He was, however, very much respected 
by his colleagues and counterparts. 
Unlike Masaryk, Karel Kramar looked to the East for 
Czech salvation. His abiding belief in the pan-Slavic 
movement actually foresaw the possibility of a Russian Grand 
Duke wearing the crown of St. Wenceslas and continued to do 
so until the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 whereupon he 
joined the "Westerners." He was looked upon by the Habsburg 
Crown as a rebel, and his Young Czechs were regarded as 
revolutionaries. Franz Joseph referred to the Young Czech 
victory in the 1898 elections where they returned more seats 
than their older more conservative Old Czech colleagues as 
an example of the stupidity of the voting peasants and an 
indication of the revolutionary aims of the Young Czech 
leaders [52]. The disdain the Viennese government had for 
Kramar would become more apparent during the war with the 
military clique in charge. 
Masaryk's Realists were allied with the new Czech 
Social Democrats who, by 1907, were the largest single Czech 
political party, with Kramar's Young Czechs close behind. 
Masaryk and Bene~ during the first decade of the new 
century both held that Zweiteilung may indeed be the 
Bohemian answer and that Staatsrecht was of dubious merit--
rather curious convictions coming from the future President 
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and Foreign Minister of the future independent Czechoslovak 
Republic. 
• • • there arose individual voices from the Czech 
camp that were nearer • • • to the German point of 
view. [Bene~] •.• saw the Zweiteilung as not so 
bad and, in contrast to the Czech party's 
standpoint vis-a-vis the Kreise Abgnenzung, [he] 
saw the basis for a solution to the national 
question. [S3] 
Dr. Bene~' opinion was published in 1908 in Le Proplem 
Autrichien et la Question Tcheque, in which he states: 
Certainly the struggle could never be completely 
avoided but by Zweiteilung many causes of strife 
could. The state [Austria] would leave the 
problems • • • to the individual national 
territories ••• and would insure only law and 
order. • • • [Each] nationality would • 
develop its own resources, and the state would 
favor none over the other. [S4] 
As for the concept of Staatsrecht he goes on to say in the 
above-mentioned work, 
It responds excellently to the wishes and dreams of 
the Czechs but has little practical and realistic 
value. • • • One cannot seriously think of 
establishing a Czech state if one-third of the 
population [Germans] is ready to fight with all 
means. [SS] 
Bene~ was obviously much influenced by his mentor, Masaryk, 
who felt that the Czech cause did not rest on the principle 
of Staatsrecht but simply on the notion of free people 
living as equal Austrians [S6]. The most important point 
,---~--
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Masar§k makes here is the "equal nationalities" idea, for it 
does not necessarily mean "national autonomy." 
Masaryk's position approached the German demands for 
national separation and thus offered a compromise, asking 
for recognition of the bilingual character of all public 
agencies in Bohemia but not demanding that officials have a 
command of both languages [57]. 
It was just that "bilingual character" that Germans saw 
as the greatest threat to the unilingual character of their 
German areas. Masar~k's watered down "Badeni Laws" had no 
appeal whatsoever to the zweiteilung proponents. What good 
would Zweiteilung be if that which Zweiteilung was devised 
to thwart was allowed to go on unabated--namely the 
bilingualism and Czech incursion from which the Germans 
wished to isolate themselves? 
Negotiations between those Czechs and Germans who were 
still willing to hope for a solution had been reduced to a 
game of first moves. That is, the Czechs were willing to 
discuss national partition of Bohemia only after language 
laws allowing both languages equal footing throughout all 
Bohemia had been accepted--these, in essence, were Masaryk's 
terms. The Germans demanded the administrative partition 
first which, of course, would render such language laws 
superfluous, for the autonomous nature of the German areas 
would simply, and legally, close their borders to Czech 
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immigrants and parity of the Czech language [58]. 
Among the Germans was an Imperial deputy from Aussig in 
North Bohemia, who, for the same reasons as Masaryk and 
Benes, bears mentioning. Deputy Dr. Rudolf Ritter Lodgman 
von Auel was a member of the German Progressive Party, one 
of the German opposition parties. Lodgman, however, 
rejected Zweiteilung and refused to fix his name on the 
Whitsuntide Plan which many Progressives endorsed. 
He was of the opinion that the Czech settlements in 
the German areas, based as [they were] on 
overwhelming economic necessity, would not be 
stymied by Gebietsabgrenzung. [59] 
Lodgman, who spoke Czech without an accent and was in 
closer touch with Slav feelings than his colleagues [60], 
believed the "Personal Principle" of the Moravian Compromise 
much more acceptable than territorial delimitation. 
Ironically, just as Masaryk and Bene~ did not object to 
Zweiteilung but would later become the personification of 
Staatsrecht, Lodgman, who opposed Zweiteiling, was to become 
governor of the German-Bohemian Autonomous Province in late 
1918 and thus the very personification of Zweiteilung. 
WAR 
In December 1914, shortly before his departure to go 
abroad for the duration of the war, Dr Masaryk had a 
conversation with his friend, former Prime Minister Dr. 
Ernst von Korber. The following dialogue shows the new 
Czech-German relation war had created. 
Masaryk: If Austria wins, will Vienna be capable 
of carrying out the necessary reforms? 
Korber (decidedly): No! Victory would strengthen 
the old system, and a new system under the young 
••• Archduke Charles ••• , would be no better 
than the old. The soldiers would have the upper 
hand ••• and they would centralize and Germanize. 
It would be absolutism with parliamentary 
embellishments. 
Masaryk: Will Germany be wise enough to make her 
ally adopt reforms? 
Korber: Hardly. [61] 
Bene§ and Masaryk now wholeheartedly supported the 
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maintenance of the historic borders of Staatsrecht with the 
added claim to Slovakia. Not even Palacky had claimed both, 
and Masaryk's contradictory demands of the lands of St. 
Wenceslas plus the Hungarian region of Slovakia, which had 
never belonged to the Bohemian kingdom, would result in later 
criticism. Bene~ and Masaryk further rejected federalism 
and embraced complete independence. 
As for what Masaryk envisioned for the Germans of 
Bohemia, he had by April 1915 stated, 
It may seem to be a paradox, but it is only on the 
principle of nationality that we wish to retain our 
German minority ••• [for] in no country are two 
nationalities so intermixed and interwoven as in 
Bohemia. [62] 
---1 
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This is, of course, not entirely true. Mixed areas did 
indeed exist but the overwhelming majority of German 
territory was at least 90% German (63], even by later 
Czechoslovak accounts. 
Kram~I, who still looked to the East, " ••. was 
content to wait passively until the tramp of Cossack hoofs 
should sound on the streets ••• of Prague itself" (63]. 
Kramar, as did other more radical Czech leaders who 
remained in the Empire, had little choice of action. He did 
not have the luxury of espousing such dangerous ideas as 
those in self-exile in Paris, London and later Washington, 
D.C. (Benes et al) (64]. 
There were many like Kramar who believed in the 
legendary "Russian Steamroller" which, of course, never 
came. Instead, the first two years of war were marked by 
substantial victories for the Central Powers. This had a 
great effect on German Nationalists, especially in Bohemia, 
where warring Austria found her most avid patriots. 
The victories in the East brought on a heady aura of 
confidence that played into the militant radical Germans' 
hands. About this time Friedrich Naumann's book, 
Mitteleuropa, appeared; it advocated the establishment of a 
German-controlled Central Europe from the Baltic to 
Bulgaria. "Mid-Europe will have a German nucleus, will 
voluntarily [!] use the German language, which ••• is 
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already the language of intercourse of Central Europe" [65]. 
It was the resuscitation of the old grossdeutsch idea as 
embodied in the Linz Program of 1883. 
The combination of military victories, Naumann's book 
and the activities of certain Czech leaders (Kram~r and 
others had been tried for treason and were awaiting 
execution in 1915) brought forth an opinion that a 
settlement of the nationality problem in Bohemia need not 
necessarily be in agreement with the Czechs. More and more 
the idea was pushed to the front that the problem should be 
solved by a decree from above favoring, of course, the 
German position [66]. 
The upshot was the notorious Easter Demands of 1916, 
signed by individuals of all Austro-German political 
parties. Lodgmann, who was making headway in the direction 
of a settlement based on the "Personal System," refused to 
sign the Demands. If he felt the Whitsuntide Plan to be 
radical, he certainly would not fix his name on a 
resuscitated Linz Plan. 
All the old demands were there: German as state 
language, separation of Galicia and " ••• [the] insistence 
on the legal recognition of German political, cultural and 
racial superiority" (67]. 
The old Emperor naturally refused to sign what was 
tantamount to an abrogation of the 1867 constitution, which 
75 
gave, albeit unspecified, guarantees of equality to all 
nationalities. Neither would his heir, Emperor Karl I, who 
donned the imperial crown in December 1916, after Franz-
Joseph finally passed on. 
The actual situation for Czechs in Bohemia was not so 
very different from that proposed by the Easter Demands. 
Public meetings were banned; the Sokols were outlawed by 
military officials; and by 1917, 20,000 citizens had been 
arrested, including businessmen and political leaders no 
longer enjoying parliamentary immunity (the Reichsrat had 
been closed since the outbreak). "Until the change of 
regime which followed the death of Francis Joseph, the 
Czechs were as completely muzzled as any people in Europe" 
[ 6 8] • 
With the arrival of Karl to the throne, momentous 
developments occurred. Aware of the deepening resentment in 
Bohemia as elsewhere, Karl took on a mantle of appeasement, 
both at home and abroad. He reconvened the Reichsrat in May 
1917 and appointed Dr. Ernst von Seidler, a Social Democrat, 
to the Premiership. Karl gave amnesty to Kramar and others 
who returned to Prague to a hero's welcome. He put out 
peace feelers toward France through his brother-in-law, 
Prince Sixtus of Parma, the disclosure of which prompted 
Wilhelm II to demand reaffirmation of Austro-Hungarian 
loyalty to the Dual Alliance [68]. 
76 
The opening of Parliament on May 30, 1917, saw the 
return of a very confident and outspoken Czech leadership, 
especially since Bohemia had become a virtual Czech 
interment camp. 
Only a week earlier 150 prominent Czech leaders in 
politics, business, education and the press had drafted the 
Manifesto of the Czech Parliamentary Club. It " ••• 
demanded a federal state of free and equal national states 
and the union of all Czechs and Slovaks" (70]. This brazen 
official demand for Slovakia followed close on the heels of 
the French reply to President Wilson's request for an 
articulation of Allied war aims. The French government's 
response included " ••• the liberation of Italians, of 
Slavs, of Roumainians [sic] and of Czecho Slovaks from 
foreign domination" (71]. Bene~ and other Czech exiles in 
Paris were doing good work. 
With the inclusion of Slovakia the German nationalists 
correctly felt that Czech demands now rested upon a 
contradictory basis of historic rights in their claims to 
all Bohemia and national self-determination in their claims 
to Slovakia. If logically applied, the latter should leave 
the German-Bohemians free to unite with Austria--or even 
Germany. The former, though certianly allowing the Czechs 
to claim German-Bohemia, would not allow claims to Slovakia. 
The Czechs were accused of wanting it both ways while not 
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granting either way to the Germans [72]. 
The manifesto was defeated all down the non-Czech line. 
To the Hungarians it was tantamount to a declaration of war 
[73]. Seidler's proclamation of a federalized Austria, 
which was merely an updated version of the Brunn Plan, was 
also rejected. Parliament proved no more effective than it 
had been before the war. 
There was one difference however. Parliament provided 
a forum for the discontentment of the various nationalities 
in the Empire as before 1914, but now the Allies too were 
listening. They were beginning to understand the potential 
value in the exploitation of national grievances. 
Understanding the potential value of friends in the 
Entente camp, the Czechs missed no opportunity to let their 
views be known in Parliament. This "talking through the 
window" was chiefly for the benefit of the outside world in 
general. They wanted the Entente to know that a potential 
ally awaited within the confines of the Austro-Hungarian 
empire. This also afforded a way of talking to their 
kinsmen in exile (74]. By late 1917 the Czech kinsmen were 
talking back. 
Eduard Bene~ sent word from his Paris-based 
Czechoslovak National Committee that the time was right for 
a general statement emanating not from the floor of 
Parliament but from Prague itself. 
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Therefore, on January 6, 1918, through Bene~' 
prompting, " ••• writers, all the Czech delegates of the 
Reichsrat and the Diets of the Bohemian Crown • " [75] 
convoked at Prague a convention which drafted the so-called 
"Epiphany Manifesto." 
Besides the fact that it came from Prague and that 
"Czechoslovakia" be allowed to attend the peace conference, 
there was nothing really new in its demands. Incidentally 
the Czechs at home were still proposing a Czechoslovakia 
within an Austrian Empire. Their actions were provocative, 
but not seditious. 
The significance of the Manifesto is not so much its 
content nor even its intention, but the response it 
solicited from the German-Bohemians who were prompted to 
their strongest action to date. 
Prior to 1918 there had been some talk of enacting an 
autonomous German-Bohemian Province answerable to Vienna but 
having nothing to do with Prague. By mid-January 1918 it 
had become audible from German Bohemian delegates in 
general. First they condemned the present Ministry of 
Seidler when they announced to the press 
• • • that the United German Bohemian Deputies 
[excluding Social Democrats] were going into 
opposition to the Seidler cabinet. They further 
announced that they no longer have confidence in 
Dr. Seidler and the Ministerium due to their 
wavering and weakness in regards to the Czechs. 
[76] 
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They ended with an attack on the government that every 
household in the agriculturally poor German areas could 
understand. [Our actions are] " ••• also due to the 
ongoing economic crisis and the government's failure to keep 
promises to procure much needed coal and food stuffs" [77]. 
The fuel and food shortages in German Bohemia, as in 
Vienna, were bad in 1917. By January 1918, the situation 
was critical. The fact that the Czech-inhabited Central 
Plain was relatively well off resulted in accusations of 
hoarding, which only increased tensions. 
One week after declaring their parliamentary opposition 
to Seidler, the United German-Bohemians published their own 
declaration of "German-Bohemian Staatsrecht." The very use 
of the sacred Czech motto indicates a real desire to fight 
back with language equal to that of the Czechs. 
The salient points of the Staatsrechtlichen Deklaration 
der Deutschbohmischen Abgeordneten are as follows: 
In these times of troubles the revolutionary Czechs 
seek to exploit the situation, smash the Empire and 
place 3.5 million Germans under the yoke of a 
Bohemian Slav State. [For these reasons the] ••• 
people of Deutschbohmen demand the establishment of 
an autonomous Deutschbohmischen Provinz with all 
rights and privileges of a Crownland within 
Imperial Austria and with no ties to the Czech part 
of Bohemia what-so-ever. [In addition to their] 
••• right to live free of Czech bondage, [they 
also declared] • • • that we no longer recognize 
the Provincial Diet of ••• Bohemia [at Prague]. 
[78] 
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This represents a marked change in the German attitude 
toward their role in Bohemia. The Whitsuntide Plan 
advocated control of the Prague Diet, while now the German 
wished no connection to it at all. It would appear that the 
Germans of Bohemia were tacitly recognizing the autonomous 
position of the Czechs so as to have their own position 
recognized as the same. They also demanded the formation of 
German Kreise within which schools, official language, etc., 
would be entirely controlled by the Germans. 
The borders of these individual German Kreise, 
according to Radical German Party leader Dr. Raphael Pacher, 
chief draftsman of the declaration, already existed along 
the constituency borders drawn for the Reichsrat elections 
of 1907 [79]. 
And so by February 1918, both Bohemians, Czechs and 
Germans had each presented their claims before the official 
forum in Vienna, such as it was. 
FOREIGN INTERVENTION 
Meanwhile, though the Czechoslovak National Council in 
Paris was recognized as a belligerant ally, French, British 
and American administrations were shying away from any 
commitment of recognition of the proposed borders of the 
future state. Indeed, the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire was initially rejected as an allied war aim. The 
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rights of oppressed peoples was one thing; the destruction 
of Central European unity was quite another. 
In February 1917, the U.S. Secretary of State directed 
his Ambassador to the Court of St. James to inform the 
British government of President Wilson's desire to keep 
Austria-Hungary intact. 
The President believes • • • that were it possible 
for him to give the necessary assurances to the 
government of Austria, which fears radical 
dismemberment, he could force the acceptance of [a 
separate] peace. [80] 
Great Britain and France were vacillating, however. In 
Mr. Balfour's address to the Imperial Council on Foreign 
Policy of May 1917, he stated, "As regards Bohemia • 
[which] has a hatred of German civilization " . . . , 
apparently not realizing that two-fifths of Bohemians were 
Germans, " • • • whether all these feelings could not 
be satisfied by giving Bohemia some sort of autonomy in the 
Empire I am not so sure" (87]. 
It was not until the spring of 1918 and the failure of 
a separate peace that the U.S. and Entente Powers began 
recognizing the individual national councils as de facto 
representatives of future states and that the Austro-
Hungarian Empire must perish. 
The joint support extended by the West to the Congress 
of Oppressed Races of Austria-Hungary held in Rome in April 
-----i 
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1918 reveals that commitment. The American Secretary of 
State said that the proceedings were followed with great 
interest " • • • and that the nationalistic aspirations of 
the Czecho-Slovaks • • • for freedom have the earnest 
sympathy of this Governemnt" [82]. 
A few days later Italy, France and Great Britain sent 
notification of Allied solidarity: 
The Allied Governments take note with satisfaction 
of the declarations by the Secretary of State • • • 
and desire to associate themselves with it in 
expressing • • • sympathy for the national 
aspirations ••• of the Czechoslovak ••• nation. 
[83] 
Now, sympathies and support were all very fine, but they 
were not enough. 
The aim of the Czech policy was to obtain from the 
Allies a definite promise that they would establish 
an independent Czechoslovak state, [but most 
importantly] ••• within the frontiers stipulated 
by Masaryk. [84] 
Of course, Bene~ required that the boundaries " ••• not be 
drawn according to the principles of nationality" [85]. 
Such action would leave the future state with no more 
territory than the Bohemian Germans were willing to concede. 
Such requirements were met on June 23, 1918, when 
French Foreign Minister Stephen Pichon handed Bene~ a note 
which stated that France would 
••• recognize ••• officially the National 
council as the supreme organ • • • of the 
Czechoslovak Government. The historic rights of a 
nation cannot be destroyed • • • and at the proper 
time [the Government of the Republic of France] 
will endeavor ••• to secure your aspirations to 
independence within the historical boundaries of 
your provinces. [86] 
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Prime Minister Lloyd-George and President Wilson were 
unwilling to commit themselves to any territorial promises 
to the Czechoslovak National Council, stating instead that 
territorial delimitations were to be settled at the Peace 
Conference--the invitation to which was extended to the 
Czechoslovak National Council. 
Missives of Secretary of State Lansing to President 
Wilson clearly show the legal and official posture the 
Americans wished to assume--a position Benes would 
eventually play against that of France. 
I do not think it wise to give full recognition to 
the Czecho-Slovaks as a sovereign nation. • • . I 
think [a] declaration would have to contain a 
reservation as to territorial limits. [87] 
Wilson heeded Lansing's advice and worked out a plan to 
recognize the Council based on its Allied war efforts only 
and not on Czechoslovak territorial claims. 
The President then sent to Lansing's desk the following 
draft which was passed to the Czechoslovak National Council: 
The Government of the United States ••• 
recognizes the Czecho-Slovak National Council as a 
de facto belligerent clothed with proper authority 
to direct the military and political affairs of 
[the same] • [ 8 8] 
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Wilson noted on the margin that he felt that Lansing 
had II successfully stated both the actual facts and 
the new legal relationship which we assume ••• W.W." [89]. 
Therefore Bene~ could procure the territorial blessings 
only from France. Great Britain and the U.S. held steadfast 
to the idea of nothing being decided until a peace 
conference could be convened. Thus, two divergent 
interpretations emerged of what the map of Europe looked 
like in mid-1918. Wilson and Lloyd-George recognized the 
continuation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire until such time 
as the peace conference dismantled it. Clemen~eau, on the 
other hand, saw her as already in pieces. 
COLLAPSE 
While Bene~ and Masaryk were consolidating the Czech 
position in the Allied camp during the summer of 1918, the 
machinery of the Austro-Hungarian government was plodding 
along--if only by inertia. 
In Bohemia, the German Nationalists, if no longer so 
sure of a Central Power victory, were ever confident that 
the establishment of their autonomous province was just 
around the corner--national self-determination having become 
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the catch word of victor and vanquished alike based on 
Wilson's Fourteen Points of January 1918. 
This German-Bohemian confidence was evidenced in the 
press which reported the daily debates of Parliament in 
Vienna. 
Five months after the German-Bohemian declaration of 
their own Staatsrecht, the leading Bohemian newspaper ran 
this story on the front page: 
Informed circles indicate the order for the 
Einkreisung [formation of homogenous Kreisel 
imminent. • • • Preparations have advanced though 
not complete, especially concerning the national 
demarcations of Pilsen and Budweis. (90] 
Both Pilsen and Budweis, long controlled by a German 
municipal adminstration, were among those cities "lost" to 
the Czechs during the migration of the last years of the 
previous century. In truth there never was a German 
majority in either city, and by the 1921 census both showed 
less than 18% German (91]. 
The article went on to list the six German Kreise which 
were to be erected along Bohemia's borders with Prussia, 
Saxony, Bavaria and Upper and Lower Austria: Eger to the 
extreme west and stronghold of the most avid nationalists; 
Reichenberg to the north where the provincial capital of the 
same name was to be located; Leitmeritz, which encompasses 
the Erzgebirge rich with lignite deposits and runs along 
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northwest Bohemia between Eger and Reichenberg; German 
Pilsen in the central west; German Budweis in the south, and 
Trautenau along northeast Bohemia, which encompasses the 
mineral-rich Sudeten Mountains. (See Appendix, Map 3.) 
Czech Bohemia was divided up into nine Kreise, which 
clustered in the center of the country. Two days later the 
headlines asked: 
When will the Kreiseinteilung come? ••• More 
debates within the German parties •••• German 
party leaders expressed the opinion that they must 
be patient • • • • A decision may be reached by 
Saturday. [ 9 2] 
After a brief recess of Parliament the news on May 14 
clearly indicated a pattern • • • "Postponement of the 
Kreiseinteilung due to Czech Holiday" [93]. 
Apparently Dr. Seidler considered it bad form to 
destroy Czech national aspirations of their historic rights 
on the three hundredth anniversary of the Prague 
Defenestrations. "The Minister President [Seidler] wants 
to spare the sensitivities of the Czechs" [94]. Further it 
was decided " • • • that decisions would not be made in the 
immediate future, ••• perhaps after Monday" [95]. 
Instead of printing the story of the failures of the 
great German offensives, the May 25 edition of the Prager 
Tagblatt ran a map showing the dispersal of the now five 
Kreise. (Pilsen was abandoned, but the surrounding German 
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Bezirke were to be attached to the Eger Kreise. 
Still nothing could be settled. Seidler's efforts to 
reach a settlement ended with his fall in July. Baron 
Hussarek, his successor, though Czech, was unloved by the 
new Vienna-based Czech National Council led by Karel Kramar 
himself, who three years earlier was awaiting execution for 
treason. 
Hussarek tried to soothe the Germans by vague promises 
of partition in Bohemia but found that this only infuriated 
the Czechs while not really appeasing the Germans [96]. 
During the last months matters had so deteriorated as 
to render the empire ungovernable. The Piave Front was 
breaking up, and the Germans were in complete retreat in the 
West. Wilson's ambiguous reply to Emperor Karl's request 
for peace prompted the hapless last Habsburg to make his 
last-ditch effort to hold the Empire in mid-October. "A 
slapdash constitutional reform granting autonomy to the 
nations in the Austrian part of the Empire was prepared in a 
form of an Imperial Manifesto" [97]. Dr. Wiskemann refers 
to it as a " voice from the grave." 
Even the most ardent German nationalist now recognized 
that the various nationalities of the Empire no longer 
needed an imperial manifesto to set up their respective 
states. An official communique from the Eger City Council 
states: 
Now it has gone so far that the establishment of a 
Czech State seems to be indeed the case. It is for 
that reason that our • • • just claims for the 
establishment of an autonomous province of German-
Bohemia be fulfilled. German Bohemia and Egerland 
will never subject themselves to the Czechs. [98] 
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The situation was indeed fluid, and events were occurring at 
break-neck speed. 
On October 29, the Bohemian citizens read that on the 
day before, the Imperial Viceroy or Staathalter in Prague, 
Count Coudenhove, " ••• had taken an extended vacation" 
[99]. That same day, four Czech representatives of the 
Vienna branch of the Czechoslovak National Council, Rasin, 
Svehla, Soukup and Stribrny quietly looked over the 
government in Prague in a " • • • businesslike rather than 
heroic fashion" [100]. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GERMAN-BOHEMIAN 
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT 
On the morning of October 29, 1918 the German-Bohemian 
national leaders, who ten days earlier had sworn never to 
subject themselves to a Czech state, woke up citizens of 
Czechoslovakia. 
There was no time to lose. 
In answer to the Czech action on October 29, the 
delegates from Bohemia met in Vienna and proclaimed the 
establishment of the Autonomous Province of German Bohemia, 
stating that it was to be a part of the new German-Austrian 
State in accordance with Wilsonian principles of the right 
of national self-determination. 
The next day the Austrian National Provisional 
Assembly, made up of those members of the Reichsrat who 
represented German-Austria, accepted the German-Bohemian 
Province as part of the new Austrian State [1]. 
Thus, the German areas of Bohemia were both recognized 
by and represented in the de facto government of Austria. 
The tenets of the German Bohemian position, as they 
appeared in the Proclamation of October 29th 1918 were 
fundamentally based on denials of Czech claims to the German 
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territories of Bohemia. They can be summarized into three 
major areas. "The Czechs claim German Bohemia belongs, 
historically, to their state but yellowing parchment cannot 
abolish the living rights of the German people" [2]. 
The Germans pointed out what they saw as glaring 
inconsistencies and double standards in the Czech 
Staatsrecht historical claims. 
The Czechs, who, on the basis of the nationality 
principle claim Hungarian Slovakia, although it 
has historically never been part of their state, 
have no right to deny the German people that same 
nationality principle [in their desire to remain 
Austrian]. The Czechs further claim that to retain 
German-Bohemia [the Germans preferred the word 
'annex'] ••• would have ••• economic and 
strategic advantages • • • to their state • • • , 
but no people have the right to violate another 
race to insure their own economic [prosperity] or 
to insure their borders strategically. [3] 
The economic issue was indeed important for a mutual 
dependency existed between the Czechs and Germans in 
Bohemia. It was a double-edged sword for the Germans of 
Bohemia: the gain of their territory meant the loss of 
their principal foodstuff source, a source guaranteed them 
only by inclusion into the Republic of Czechoslovakia. At 
the same time, though inclusion meant food for the Germans 
in Bohemia, it meant to Austria proper the loss of her 
principal industrial areas. Bohemian coal was essential to 
the life of Vienna as well as Graz, Linz and Salzburg. 
The loss of German-Bohemia would make an Anschluss with 
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the German Reich all the more necessary if Austria were to 
survive as a state. One can be sure that the motives of 
Vienna to keep German-Bohemia were based more on the hard 
facts of economics than were those of the more romantic 
nationalists in Reichenberg, the new provincial capital. 
The third principle of the German rejection of Czech 
claims came in the form of a prophetic warning: "If the 
Czechs carry through with their 'annexation' plans, it will 
only do them harm. Czechoslovakia would then contain a 
[strong] German irredenta" [4]. One would presume that 
referred to a desire to again be Austrian, but it must be 
remembered that most Germans believed that, in accordance 
with the Wilsonian principles of national self-
determination, an Austro-German Anschluss was imminent. 
• • • frightened by the prospect of Slav domination 
and worried about lack of food and fuel, German-
Austrians from all classes and political parties 
abandoned the Habsburg throne and sought refuge in 
a national destiny with their fellow Germans. [5] 
Also important is Article II of the Proclamation which 
allows the Governor of Deutschbohmen control over finance, 
justice and the right to raise a Volkswehr or militia. 
The almost comical twist to the brazen declarations of 
both sides is that neither Czech nor Bohemian-German as of 
yet had any military might with which to enforce their 
demands. The Armistice would not begin for another week and 
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even then most returning soldiers, especially German, were 
little inclined to put their uniforms back on. The Czechs 
did have some limited resources in their re-enacted Sokol 
units, and within a few weeks they would have an army; but 
for the time being both lacked any real means of enforcing 
their proclamations. 
Within days the German delegates from Moravian and 
Silesian German areas joined the Bohemians and declared 
themselves part of the Austrian Republic. And so by 
November 1, all three Crownlands of the former Kingdom of 
Bohemia had delegates sitting in the German-Austrian 
Provisional Government in Vienna. 
The German-Bohemian Province was easy to establish. 
The basic outlines had been worked out on paper for nearly 
twenty years. 
The borders of the German Kreise were drawn according 
to the electoral Bezirke of the 1907 parliamentary election 
[6]. 
In the south a fairly homogeneous strip, the Bohemian 
Forest District, lay along the frontier of Upper Austria, 
and local leaders in Krumau hoped to eventually attach their 
area to the administration in Linz [7]. 
In the north and west of Bohemia (which bordered 
Prussia, Saxony and Bavaria, not Austria) lived the largest 
concentration of Germans. The nationalist stronghold of 
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Reichenberg was the obvious choice for its capital and was 
soon considered the capital of all German-Bohemia [8], with 
Radical Party Deputy, Dr. Raphael Pacher, as its governor. 
Moravia and Silesia, having a different history in 
regards national demarcation, were a bit more complicated. 
Southern Moravia, like southern Bohemia, had an indisputable 
strip of German territory which ran along Austria's northern 
border. The German-Moravian leaders in the southern 
Moravian city of Znaim hoped to incorporate it eventually 
into lower Austria [9]. 
In Austrian-Silesia the German Nationalist Party Deputy 
Dr. Freissler became governor and set up his government in 
Trappau; he claimed responsibility for the Germans of 
Silesia, North Moravia and parts of East Bohemia; and, after 
rejecting the proposed name of Altvaterland, gave this 
combined area the name of Sudetenland, which later became 
the general term for all German areas in Czechoslovakia 
[ 10] • 
In Moravia there existed several Deutche Sprachinseln--
Brunn, Olmutz, Zwitlau, and others--and so a fifth national 
council was set up for Brunn and central Moravia. (See 
Appendix, Map 4.) 
The fact that the greatest number of Germans living in 
the Crownlands did not border the German-Austrian state was 
not of great concern. The day after Emperor Karl's 
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abdication on November 11, 1918, the Austrian Democratic 
Republic proclaimed itself part of the German Republic. 
At the time, the individual provisional governments set 
up in Reichenberg, Troppau, Krumau and Zniam seemed the 
best transitional arrangement until the awaited Anschluss 
could be completed [11]. Those areas not attached to 
Austria proper would then simply become parts of Bavaria, 
Saxony and Prussia later. 
In early November Dr. Pacher was offered the post of 
Minister of Education in the new Austrian Socialist 
Government of Karl Renner, and he took it. Dr. Rudolph 
Lodgmann, Progesssive German Party leader, took over the 
governorship from Pacher and chose the able Social Democrat 
Joseph Seliger as his deputy governor. 
It must be remembered that the Germans of the most 
radical nationalist variety did not advocate Zweiteilung, 
but total domination of Bohemia such as suggested in the 
Linz Plan and the Easter Demands of 1916. Thus, the leaders 
of the German-Bohemian Provisional Government were not of 
that type and should never be compared with Henlein or the 
Nazis of seventeen years later. George Schonerer and 
Hermann Wolf were indeed Bohemians from Egerland, but they 
were not part of the then-German leadership. 
The new democratic government of Renner and Adler had 
no problem with the establishment of the Czechoslovak 
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Republic; they actually sent congratulatory greetings to 
Prague. It was only the territorial delimitations that were 
at issue [12]. The Renner government therefore recognized 
the government at Prague and hoped to open doors for 
discussions by sending Lodgmann to Prague to discuss food 
and coal shipments as early as October 30, 1918. It seems 
the Czechs had halted shipments of what they now considered 
their coal from German North-Bohemia to Vienna--a city 
highly dependent on the food and resources the vast empire 
had previously supplied [13]. 
Lodgmann was instructed to skirt the territorial issue 
and discuss aid only, but the Czechs would have no part of 
it. Discussions precluded recognition of authority in the 
German areas and so, with neither accepting the credentials 
of the other, the talks could not even begin. On November 4 
Seliger himself tried his hand but was rebuffed with the 
famous remark, " ••• with rebels we do not negotiate," 
first used in 1848 by Prince Windischgraetz to the Czechs 
during the Prague uprising. 
Besides the terrible lack of food and fuel and probably 
because of it, Lodgmann was faced with another problem. 
There was, beginning in November, an increase in social 
unrest that had a Bolshevik hue to it. Reports from the 
workers' districts of German cities in North-Bohemia were 
increasing. The November 34d Prager Tagblatt reported, 
The city [Aussig, Lodgmann's own constituency] and 
environs today looked like a scene from the Russian 
Revolution. • • • The rice grainery was burned and 
millions worth of food and clothing have been 
plundered, ••• machine gun fire could be heard 
••• six persons die. [14] 
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There was nothing unique about the troubles in Aussig. 
On November 4 the press reported that in Innsbruck and Linz 
• • • crowds formed demanding their October 
allotments of sugar from the Neftomitzer Refinery 
••• and were under the leadership of soldiers. 
City militia with machine guns have taken up 
positions. [15] 
The fighting ended in the trenches and was resumed in 
the streets as the soldiers began coming home. Many 
returning soldiers were of a definite leftist bent. The 
horror of the trenches produced few monarchists and made 
Socialists out of many nationalist bourgeoisie of pre-War 
days. This new communist inclination had many leaders 
worried, Lodgmann among them. 
OCCUPATION 
As mentioned above, the German-Bohemian government had 
precious little at its disposal with which to squelch social 
unrest. Help would have to come from elsewhere. Governor 
Lodgmann had two choices: appeal to the German Reich for 
troops across Bohemia's northern and western borders (Aussig 
lies only 30 miles from the Saxon border, 130 miles from 
Austria), or request military aid from the now-growing 
Czechoslovak Army. 
The latter would be forthcoming if summoned, but 
Lodgmann correctly feared, as he states in a letter to 
Pacher, 
••• solicitation of Czech military aid to 
squelch unrest would, in effect, dislodge the 
German [government in Bohemia] and recognition of 
[the] Czech Army and nation would follow. [16] 
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The former had little hope for success for, as early as 
mid-October, the idea of a German Reich military 
intervention in German-Bohemia had been rejected by Wilhelm 
II himself. Only the representatives of the German General 
Staff were in favor of such action. The representatives of 
the Saxon Legation in Vienna observed dryly, " ••• the 
gentlemen of the military are always willing to march off 
somewhere" [17]. As it turned out, however, cooler heads 
prevailed. The Saxon Legate in Vienna advised his capital 
in late October: 
• • • such action [as suggested by the 
aforementioned General Staff] would disrupt the 
peace negotiations [then underway] • • • and poison 
our [Saxony's] advantagous relationship with our 
Czech neighbor. [18] 
In the end it was to the Czech authorities that the 
plea went. And, as Lodgmann had feared, the Czechs did not 
come to squelch unrest but to occupy. 
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On November 10, the Saxon Attache, Bendorff, attached 
to the Saxon Legation in Vienna, sent Dresden reports that 
• • • the Czechoslovak military has been moving 
into both partially and wholly German settled areas 
[of Bohemia] ••• and [units] are moving into the 
Sudetenland of [North Moravia and Silesia]. [19] 
The Czechs, starting from Aussig, slowly and meeting 
virtually no resistance, began occupying German Bohemia. 
Again Vienna and Reichenberg appealed to Saxony for 
assistance, this time, however, not to restore order but to 
help the German-Bohemians push back the Czechoslovak 
"invaders." 
Bendorff to Dresden: 
They [Austrian Provisional National Assembly] have 
requested of me to convey the request of immediate 
arms and munitions. Czech border officials [are] 
disarming returning German-Bohemian troops at the 
borders • • • very little ordinance on hand • • • 
Saxon attack desired only as last resort. [20] 
On the eve of the Armistice of November 11 in Germany and a 
full week after that of Austria-Hungary, the Vienna 
representative of the German General Staff, General von 
Crabon, designated which arms would be required to repel the 
Czechoslovak army of the Allied Powers: II twelve 
artillery pices, 12,000 shells, 3000 rifles with 1.5 million 
rounds, 30 machine guns with 300,000 rounds • II [21] • 
Germany at this time, besides having her own domestic 
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clashes, was attempting to put on her best face for the 
upcoming peace conference. Aiding in military action 
against a recognized government of the Entente, which 
Czechoslovakia now was, was hardly consistent with this 
attitude. 
Dresden and Berlin spoke volumes by their refusal to 
even reply to Vienna's requests. 
DIPLOMATIC CAMPAIGNS 
Throughout mid-November Czech troops returning from 
Italy and France, Sokols and returning Czech Legionniers, 
and a newly-organized home army, of which more shall be 
said, were moving into the isolated mid-Moravian German 
"language islands." 
Lodgmann then appealed to President Wilson through the 
neutral Swedish Embassy on November 13. 
In the name of 2.5 million Germans in Bohemia who, 
appealing to the right of self-determination, 
consider themselves a ••• part of the free German 
Austrian Republic [proclaimed the day before] 
•••• We protest against the armed forces of the 
Czech State. It is plain that the Czechs want the 
German population to relinquish its right to self-
determination and to forestall a free agreement 
••• at the Peace Conference. [22] 
The German-Austrian government sent notes to Washington in 
support of Lodgmann, one of which came in the form of a 
proposed solution. After reiterating the argument extolling 
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the true German character of the territory under question, 
the new Foreign Minister, Dr. Otto Bauer, challenged the 
Allies, "If the Allied Powers have no doubt " . • • • I ln 
terms of the German-Bohemian loyalty to the German-Austrian 
Republic: 
••. the ••• Government proposes, ••• without 
delay, ••• a plebiscite ••• guided by neutral 
authorities. The Austro-German Government asks the 
Allied Powers not to decide upon the fate of the 
people in question except upon the basis of this 
plebiscite. [23] 
What Bauer was requesting is that decisions not be made 
on the basis of the Czechoslovak faits accomplis, i.e., 
occupation. Bene~, meanwhile, was attempting that very 
thing, namely to secure diplomatic territorial recognition 
based on occupation, which, by December, was all but 
complete. 
To understand the position the Entente took in response 
to the requests of Lodgmann and Bauer, one must first 
understand the relationship between Bene~ and the Entente. 
Bene~, in order to secure both the means and the sanction of 
occupation, needed to convince his Allies of the value of a 
strong Czech military position in Central Europe. This he 
did first by understanding their goal--the defeat of 
Germany; and secondly their fear--communist agitation in 
East-Central Europe. 
As early as October 1918, the Czech leaders were 
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working on the establishment of a Czech army within the 
homeland. When in late October the plan was put forward for 
an Allied offensive from the southeast, Austria-Hungary was 
seen as the ideal springboard for such an attack. 
The plans of October 31 called for 
• • • free movement over road and rail in Austro-
Hungarian territory. Armies shall occupy such 
strategic points as they deem necessary • • • to 
conduct military operations or maintain order. 
[24] 
This was Benes' chance. What better way to get a military 
force into Bohemia than to offer one's services for the 
movement through territory about which French, British and 
American commands knew so little and the Czech units 
fighting in Italy and France knew so much? With Czech 
forces " • • • occupying such strategic points as they deem 
necessary ••• ," the Czechoslovak National Council would 
be in complete military and territorial control of the 
Crownlands and Slovakia by mid-November, or so Benes 
thought. 
Unfortunately for Bene~, Germany was unwilling to 
cooperate with his scheme and surprisingly signed the 
Armistice on November 11. In one fell swoop there was no 
longer a need for an Allied presence in the crumbling 
empire. 
Thus Bene~ could not get an army into Czechoslovakia on 
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the Allied Powers' coat tails, but he did have one great 
advantage. The nullification of the offensive plan left no 
plan at all. Neither power had, in November 1918, any 
articulated plan for the defunct empire--Bene~ would fill 
that vacuum [25]. 
By November 9, Bene~ had notified Kram&r, now in 
Prague, that a French military mission to Prague would 
organize a Czechoslovak army, not composed of Allied troops, 
but of Czech troops • 
• • • by military convention between Czechoslovakia 
and France ••• Czech forces technically became 
Allied troops and ••• could participate in 
carrying out the terms of the Armistice • • • which 
included the right to 'occupy strategic points' 
within Austro-Hungarian territory such as the 
Bohemian borderlands of the west. [26] 
What is more, the Czechoslovak Army was placed under the 
command of Marshal Foch, Supreme Allied Commander--no one 
could question its authority. 
How did Bene~ pull it off? 
Unable to get into Czechoslovakia once the offensive 
was cancelled, Bene~ then convinced the Allies that a 
Czechoslovak military presence in Central Europe was the 
only thing between order and anarchy--between democracy and 
communism. 
The Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, still operating out 
of Paris, sent his own diplomatic communique to London, 
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Washington and Paris to counter Bauer's proposed plebiscite 
idea. Bene~ painted a picture of utter chaos in Austria and 
blamed it on Bauer. 
The German population of Bohemia • • • is quietly 
accepting its incorporation with the Czecho-Slovak 
State. It is only Vienna by agitating Bohemia that 
wishes to discredit us (to the Entente) •••• (The 
Vienna Government threatens the Entente with 
Bolshevik revolution in Vienna) and [blames] the 
Czechs because [we] • • • refuse to supply Vienna 
with food and coal. [27] 
Vienna was indeed starving and freezing in winter 1918-
19. According to American Relief Administration personnel 
in a missive dated 16 December, "We [have] a most acute 
situation in Vienna which city has less than ten day's 
supply of food." And in early January, "We [are] only days 
away from starvation in Vienna. The Communists are 
conspiring to take over" [28]. 
Benes goes on to say in his missive to Lansing: 
••• it should be noted that Vienna continues to 
send arms across Bavaria and Saxony to equip [the 
Bohemians]. Mr Bauer ••• is a minority Socialist 
who participated in the Bolshevik revolution in 
Petrograd in 1917. (29] 
Dr. Bene~ did not disclose his sources of information 
on arm shipments. 
To cure the "communist plague" in central Europe, Bene~ 
suggested that 
Prague be permitted to establish order within its 
territories of the Historic Borders [and that] 
• • • a temporary decision [be made] to be later 
examined, ••• but, for the present the German 
inhabitants and adjacent [Austrian] Government 
would have to submit to the arrangement. [30] 
110 
Bene~ entreated his most agreeable ally, France, to 
obtain a joint declaration of approval for the provisionary 
acceptance of the occupation as a territorial delimitation. 
Knowing the resolve, especially of Washington, in remaining 
aloof until a conference could be convened, France attempted 
to obtain no joint declaration, but instead acted 
independently, as it already had in Czechoslovak matters, 
and approved Bene~' request of provisional territorial 
recognition, thus, in effect, presenting the United States 
and Great Britain with a diplomatic fait accompli [31]. 
The British were genuinely concerned about the vast 
German populations in Bohemia and thought about perhaps 
attaching some indisputable German-Bohemian salients, such 
as Rumfort, Eger and even Reichenberg, Lodgmann's capital, 
to the German Reich [32]. 
But, in the interest of Allied cooperation, France 
convinced Great Britain to communicate with Vienna, though 
Lloyd-George took a slightly different tack. He informed 
Bauer that a plebiscite could not be conducted, as all 
territorial matters must wait for the Peace Conference. 
[We] are of the opinion that pending the decision 
• • • the frontier of the Czechoslovak Republic 
should coincide with the historical boundaries of 
the provinces of Bohemia, Moravia and Austrian 
Silesia. [33] 
This, of course, though couched in somewhat more 
provisional and noncomittal language, is, in essence, 
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exactly what the Czechs wanted. The next day Italy joined 
England; Benes had three out of four. 
The Americans were the most unbending and rejected any 
discussion at all until the Conference. 
It was not that Washington was unconcerned or even 
ignorant, as Clemen~eau supposed her to be. Indeed the 
Americans were so concerned primarily about their ignorance 
of the "terra incognite" of East Central Europe that they 
commissioned the "Inquiry," a group of 150 "experts" headed 
by one Dr. Mezes, to investigate and gather information 
which would be pertinent to the Peace Conference. The 
Inquiry had spent more than a year collecting information, 
much of which Masaryk feared could ultimately lead the 
Americans to grant German-Bohemia self-determination. 
Pending the evaluations of the Inquiry on which the 
whole American position hinged, neither Wilson nor his 
representative in Paris, Colonel House, would grant the 
German-Bohemians the right to a pre-Conference plebiscite. 
Nor would they recognize the Czech occupation of German-
Bohemia as a de facto territorial determination. The 
112 
American policy of waiting it out had, by mid-December, 
become a policy that could no longer be followed, however. 
Colonel House in Paris was becoming ever more 
apprehensive about the threat of Bolshevism in central 
Europe--especially in Vienna. When he tried to get coal 
supplies to the Austrian capital he got a quick lesson in 
geography. House, therefore, had no choice but to entreat 
Masaryk, now also in Paris, to supply Vienna with what the 
Czechs considered their Bohemian coal. 
I [House] had Frazier take Hoover • • • to see 
President Masaryk, and authorized him to say that 
the United States would condemn • • • prevention of 
coal going into Austria for the relief of the 
suffering population. [ 34] 
Masaryk's reply to Hoover is predictable: "[He] 
claimed that the coal mines were in possession of the 
[Bohemian] Germans ••• it was impossible for him to take 
action • • • " [ 3 5] • 
Masaryk and Benes saw the chink in the American policy. 
Benes, in his note to Lansing of November 20, had already 
claimed that in order to insure production in the German 
coal areas, the Czechoslovak territorial jurisdiction must 
be spelled out. Because " ••• lawless bands," which Bene~ 
claimed Bauer supported with arms, have "prevented the 
mining of coal and its transportation to Vienna" [36]. 
Although Benes had addressed his plea for territorial 
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recognition to Lansing, it was Colonel House and his staff--
Walter Lippmann of the "Inquiry," Stephen Bonsal and 
others--who would carry on the negotiations. 
Once negotiations for coal to Vienna started, Colonel 
House and his staff were caught in the dilemma resulting 
from, on the one hand, granting power to a recognized 
government and on the other hand postponing any decision 
concerning the territorial limits of that government's 
power [37]. 
According to Benes (and only Benes), the United States 
government then gave an oral, unofficial consent to Czech 
occupation. No record shows that any such consent was ever 
given [38] • 
Coal was not received in Vienna for another month. 
Meanwhile during November and December 1918, one town 
after another was "falling" to the "Allied" army. On 
November 16, Prague severed communications between the 
German-Bohemian capital and her Austrian parent. " ••• 
Telegrams and letters between the Austrian Parliament and 
Reichenberg have been intercepted and banned by Czech postal 
officials ••• " [39]. 
Between December 7 and 11 Teplitz, Pribram, Marienbad 
and Aussig (Aussig for the second time) quietly delivered 
themselves to the Czech army. Teplitz, only days earlier, 
had been considered for the future capital of German-Bohemia 
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due to its more central location than Reichenberg. 
On December 12, 1918, with rumors of Czech movement 
toward Reichenberg, the German-Bohemian provisional 
government and Zweiteilung effectively came to an end. 
The Provisional Government [of Deutschboehmen) 
around seven o'clock this morning, climbed into 
trucks and fled to foreign soil. • • • The rooms 
of the government at the Hotel 'Goldener Loewe' have 
been searched but as yet the Czechoslovak troops 
have not entered the city • • • a late hour 
telegram places [Governor] Dr. Lodgmann [and 
company] in Freidland • • • [on the Bohemian Saxon 
border] • [ 40] 
Ironically, the Czech troops did not actually enter 
Reichenberg until several days later to a generally 
indifferent reception. But Lodgman, Seliger and others were 
now gone, never to return. 
By December 14 the erstwhile German-Bohemian leaders 
had established a government in exile from Vienna issuing 
proclamations and diplomatic protests as Deutschboehmen 
herself melted away. 
Dr. Freissler, Governor of the Sudetenland, held on 
until February 1919 and made some honest efforts to procure 
autonomy within the Czechoslovak State. The government of 
Znaim held on longest, until March, but only because it was 
challenged last. 
Tomas Masaryk made his presidential inaugural speech on 
December 22, 1918. He and Eduard Benes had their faits 
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accomplis to offer up at the Conference in Paris three weeks 
prior to the opening sessions. 
LAST HOPES FOR GERMAN BOHEMIA 
By the time the Paris Peace Conference actually got 
underway, the Czech occupation of German-Bohemia was an 
accomplished fact. It was recognized by the "Big Four"--
albei t to varying degrees--as a basis for settlement. 
Foreign Minister Dr. Eduard Bene~ had little more to say 
than to claim the old borders of the Three Bohemian 
Crownlands as they existed in 1914 which, for the first time 
in their history, the Czechs fully controlled. 
The attitude of the Big Four during Bene~' initial 
appearance on February 5, 1919 " ••• indicated that they 
took the existence of the Czechoslovak State for granted" 
[41]. According to the minutes of Bene~' address, Lloyd-
George actually interrupted him to say that, " ••• no 
arguments to prove the necessity of [the] annexation of 
Slovakia were needed--all four Statesmen were convinced of 
it" [42]. 
This was not the end of it, however. Though Bene~, 
Masaryk and Kramar had supplied their own plan of action 
where the Allies had none concerning the defunct Habsburg 
Empire, the fundamental differences between France, Great 
Britain and America as to the validity of Czechoslovak 
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claims required that the final decision of the "Big Four" 
(which must be unanimous) be based on the findings of the 
"Commission on Czechoslovak Affairs." 
The hope among the German-Bohemian leaders for a 
favorable decision based on the findings of the "Commission" 
was complicated, however, by the appointment of French 
Ambassador Jules Cambon as the chairman. The Commission was 
from the beginning heavily loaded toward the well-known 
French position vis-a-vis Czechoslovakia. 
At the first meeting of the Commission the French 
accepted all Benes' claims with no reservations and was able 
to get blanket approval from Great Britain, Italy and the 
United States on the issue of the 1914 borders. 
There were voices of reservation, however, chiefly from 
the American experts assigned to the Commission. Though 
genuinely concerned over the dismissal of the principle of 
national self-determination in the German-Bohemian case, 
they also knew that the wholesale convocation of the 
principle was impractical, given the economic and strategic 
realities. There also existed the danger of creating a 
precedent of national demands in, for example, Ireland, 
India or the Philippines. 
Though anything but ill-informed [43], the Americans 
who were assigned to the Commission on Czechoslovak Affairs 
were ill-equipped to match the French in diplomacy and 
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negotiations. The Wilsonian dream of a just settlement 
based on correct information supplied by "experts" gave the 
American delegation little to work with against the 
"politicians" of, especially, the French. 
By mid-March the "Commission" advised the inclusion of 
three million Germans into the Czechoslovak State. 
THE PLEBISCITE QUESTION 
Because the plebiscite was never held, the question of 
exactly where the population's sympaties lay cannot be 
easily answered. 
Ideologically-charged historiographies tend to give 
their own answers which range from current Soviet to 
Novotnyan; Nazi to Czech Republican. 
Neither the elected officials nor party distribution 
acted as a viable political barometer of the times, for 
although elected by universal suffrage, the last Austrian 
general elections were held in 1911. The lapse between then 
and late 1918 must be measured in more than time alone. The 
electorate had simply experienced too much for the elected 
to still claim the people's unquestioned mandate. 
In order to divine what was really going on in the German-
Bohemian heart and mind one must read between the lines. 
General Populations' Relation to Their Government 
The question is then to what extent were the people 
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linked to the aspirations of their leaders in German-
Bohemia? Was it a popular movement, or merely the 
activities of a small group of men whose political 
livelihood depended on assuming the leadership of a pro-
German-Bohemian position? 
As already mentioned, the Provincial Government's first 
concern was procurement of food and fuel, its second to 
squelch unrest. It was in this turbulent medium that the 
province was founded in Vienna 
• • • by a purely legislative act • • • about 
which the people [of German Bohemia] knew nothing 
for an entire week • • . because the Provincial 
Government neglected to establish a publicity 
department. [44] 
In fact, a close look at the activities of the 
Reichenberg government display a surprisingly poorly 
organized and ineffectual body claiming to be the voice of 
the people. 
The general population was in such a state of 
collapse that the government could expect little 
enthusiasm for its activities--demands couched in 
nationalistic slogans that only tended to 
complicate matters. [45] 
An article in a major Reichenberg newspaper is 
especially telling of the opinions of at least many Germans 
that predates the Czechoslovak Declaration of State on 
October 29, 1918. 
The overheated fantasies which the German 
politicians throw at us are insane! The Czechs 
yearn for peace just as we do. • • • It is not 
trenches and barricades we must build along the 
language borders [Sprachengrenze] but to strike a 
political [as opposed to military] tactic coming 
from enlightened, trustworthy representatives. 
(46] 
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The relations between the German-Bohemian middle class 
and their government is of interest here. Many viewed the 
Viennese government of Renner and Bauer--as they did that of 
Ebert in Berlin--as being too "Red" for their liking and 
preferred the more moderate bourgeois climate of 
Czechoslovakia [47]. 
When questioned in an interview about this, Victor 
Adler rejected such notions, but with some reservations • 
• • • the overwhelming majority of the middle 
class, as do the working class, are against uniting 
German-Bohemia with the Czech State. If a portion 
of the middle class view things differently • • • 
they have been [seduced] by promises of food from 
the Czechs. [ 48] 
This "seduction" may well be true. There were reports 
that returning German-Bohemian soldiers would attempt to 
smuggle their weapons into Bohemia, not to join the 
Volkswehr but to trade them to the Czechs for food. 
In any case, the conservative leanings of the German-
Bohemian middle class were only an indication of the much 
stronger sentiments of the German-Bohemian industrialists in 
general. 
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Industry's Relation to the German-Bohemian Government 
On October 2, 1918, Czech Representative Dr. Stanek 
addressed a turbulent House of Deputies in the Vienna 
Parliament. He said: II • We demand a free 
Austria • • • and the establishment of a Czechoslovak State 
is the smallest of our demands!!" German-Bohemian 
Representative Dr. Wichel cried out, "What about the Germans 
in Bohemia?" Stan~k's reply: "Ask the German factory 
owners!" [ 49] • 
The German-Bohemian industralist had much to gain by 
attaching the German areas to the Czechoslovak State--and 
much to lose if they did not. Besides the obvious reasons 
of mutual economic dependency between agriculturally-rich 
"Czechia" and mineral-rich German-Bohemia, an Austria-
Germany Anschluss, if carried through, would pit German-
Bohemian industry against that of the German Reich's much 
greater industrial capacity. 
Even without the Anschluss, the Austrian market, good 
as it might be, would undoubtedly be hindered by 
Czechoslovak duties on all shipments passing through 
undisputed Czech lands between industrial German North 
Bohemia, the Sudetenlands, and German Silesia en route to 
Austria. 
That the industrialists wished to do business with 
Prague, not Reichenberg, is definite. 
It was not only the industrialists of Northern 
Bohemia, but also those of Northern Moravia who 
were [by 1919] at any rate for the Czechoslovak 
State. [50] 
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The growing social unrest was also of great concern to 
the industrialist class. It condemned the practice of the 
Reichenberg government to attempt negotiations 
• • • on purely political demands [and suggested] 
industrial representatives of both sides to 
negotiate a quick settlement ••• for, [they 
warned,] ••• the social unrest had become so 
acute that ••• if an agreement didn't quickly 
come from above • • • a settlement would from 
below. [51] 
Apparently at least some German-Bohemia industrialists and 
Bene~ shared the same fears of Bolshevism. 
Military Relation to the German-Bohemian Government 
The futile attempt of the Provincial Government to 
raise a Volkswehr, as already shown, sheds light on the 
government-to-citizen relationship. 
In a letter written by a soldier-council leader to ex-
Governor Raphael Pacher on November 31, 1919, the general 
misgivings over being drafted for the Volkswehr are evident. 
"We want immediate disarmament and have no more inclination 
to be soldiers; come what may, we've had our fill" [52]. 
The militia that did exist was basically a collecting 
place for those individuals unable to find their way back to 
a civilian profession [53]. Many of these were carrying 
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revolutionary ideas back from the trenches and attached 
themselves to the "Peoples' Soviets" scattered throughout 
Austra and German-Bohemia, but were never coordinated into 
any real action. They eventually evaporated as the Czechs 
moved in. 
A written communique from the District National 
Committee of Tachau, an all-German Kreis, is telling of the 
feelings of at least a portion of the German-Bohemian 
people: 
Unfortunately a great part of the urban as well as 
rural citizens have been incensed by returning 
German soldiers due to worry over food and basic 
supplies, the lack of action of the German-Bohemian 
Government, the unrest in German-Bohemia and the 
thoroughly unfavorable provisions of the ceasefire. 
Finally, due to the economic ties of our areas to 
that of the Czechs • • • there remains nothing left 
but to attach on to the Czechoslovak State. Yes, a 
great part of the people wish it and it would be 
best for all. [54] 
When questioned on February 5, 1919, " ••• whether 
the inhabitants of these [German] districts, if offered the 
choice, would vote for exclusion from the Czechoslovak State 
or for inclusion ••• " Dr. Bene~ answered Lloyd-George that 
they would vote for exclusion [55]. 
Because this stands on the record and seems to be 
contrary to Bene~' own statement of the Germans "quietly 
accepting" Czech rule as well as the testimony above, the 
statement warrants explanation. 
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Bene~, ever vigilant to cast aspersions on the Vienna 
government, explained that such a decision to not join 
Czechoslovakia would be the result of Bolshevik propaganda 
emanating from the Renner-Bauer government. That is to say 
that the German-Bohemians were being duped by the Austrian 
Social Government for Austria's own reasons (56]. If this 
is true, one must remember that Austria's reasons to retain 
German Bohemia were based on desperate attempts to hold her 
former industrial possessions--an understandable economic 
imperative. 
Secondly, the social unrest that Bene~ blamed on Vienna 
justified the Czechoslovak Army and excused its occupation 
of all Bohemia. 
In all, it is difficult to say exactly which way a 
plebiscite would have gone. It is equally difficult to 
determine just what the basis of a plebescite would be. 
Self-determination meant different things to different 
people. Some may have feared that the maintenance of a 
provincial relationship with truncated Austria might only be 
possible with an Austro-German Anschluss. Othen may have 
wished the direct attachment to the Reich for purely 
geographical reasons, even though those very regions, which, 
though not connected, lay alongside the Reich, would have 
suffered economically. Some favored an autonomous position 
within Czechoslovakia--a kind of Swiss system. Others even 
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envisioned German Bohemia becoming an independent country 
and a ward of the League of Nations. 
It is quite possible that even if a majority wished to 
be excluded from Czechoslovakia, a general consensus as to 
where they wished to be included would have been 
unreachable. For one must also remember that the German 
areas of the Crownlands had all experienced different 
cultural and social histories. Industrial North Bohemia, 
for example, has very little in common with almost feudal 
South Moravia. 
In real and practical terms, a plebiscite, the purpose 
of which would be to gauge the feelings of the Bohemian 
Germans, would have been impractical and inaccurate, if not 
impossible. 
The various territorial settlements of Czechoslovakia's 
neighbors outlined the new "Successor State" along the new 
universally-recognized "Historical Borders" of the 
Staatsrecht principle (except for a few all-German salients 
which went to the Weimer Republic and which Prague was happy 
to see go) • 
Dr. Rudolph Lodgmann became the leader of the so-called 
"Negativists," who refused politically to take part in 
Czechoslovak politics. A large part of the old German 
political guard, however, had sufficient political sense to 
realize--much as the "New Czechs" had in the 1880's--that 
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one must work within the political structure if one expects 
a voice in affairs. These "Activists" or "Positivists" 
eventually fell into mainstream Czechoslovak politics, while 
others kept the German Nationalist home fires burning--
possibly awaiting a messiah. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
Beginning in 1526 the once-independent Bohemian 
Crownlands were ruled from Vienna in an ever-tightening 
policy of Austro-German hegemony and centralization. With 
the Enlightenment came the birth of nationalism which 
affected both the Central European Germans and their desire 
for a single nation-state and the oppressed nationalities of 
the Habsburg Empire, especially the Czechs, in their desire 
for the re-establishment of their own state. In Bohemia, 
where both Czechs and Germans had lived for centuries, the 
clash was inevitable and its reasons complex. 
By 1848 the republicanism of France, once imported to 
Central Europe, had distorted into a web of German-Austrian 
rivalry with the Czechs caught in the middle. Many Austro-
Germans, and especially those in Bohemia, desired a great 
United Germany with Austria participating in a Frankfurt-
centered federal republic. The Czechs, in seeing such a 
unity as the destruction of their hopes for the redemption 
of the Czech State, allied themselves with the Austrian 
Crown against the German Liberals in an attempt to preserve 
the Habsburg Empire and their own national survival. 
In Bohemia the delicate national balancing act was 
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further complicated by the social upheavals of the 
industrial revolution, which caused vast numbers of Czechs 
to migrate from their central agricultural districts into 
the mountainous German industrial centers in order to find 
work. 
To the migrating Czech it meant simple economic 
survival; to the Czech nationalist leaders the migration 
represented the "taking back" of the Czech Crownlands from 
the "invading" German settlers. To the German worker it 
meant competition for jobs; to the German nationalist 
leaders the Czech migration represented a Slavic invasion of 
the superior German culture and character of the all-German 
Bohemian districts. 
Attempts to politically isolate the Czechs through an 
elaborate curial system of artifically creating a German 
electoral majority eventually failed as the Czechs began 
using the system to their own advantage due to a marked 
amelioration of the Czech socio-economic position during 
the latter third of the nineteenth century. 
Finally, after a flurry of pro-Czech legislation, the 
German-Bohemians sought to establish the administrative 
ethnic partition of Bohemia as the only way to preserve the 
racial integrity of all their German districts. The Czech 
counter-position to this German Zweiteilung was Staatsrecht, 
that is the principle that the Crownland's borders were 
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externally inviolable and internally indivisible and that 
the Germans must accept the fact that all Bohemians, Czech 
and German, have free access within the so-called "Historic 
Borders." 
German proposals were rebuffed by the Czechs. The 
intransigence of both sides led to wholesale obstructionism 
in each successive weak coalition government from 1871 to 
the Empire's demise in 1918. 
During the First World War, Tomas Masaryk and Eduard 
Benes in exile worked with the Entente in an effort to 
establish an independent Czechoslovakia--something even the 
most ardent Czech nationalist at home had never proposed. 
Indeed, the Czechs had always maintained the necessity of a 
strong empire--albeit a federalized one. 
With the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, both 
Zweiteilung and Staatsrecht paradoxically existed within 
Bohemia, with the Czechoslovak government in Reichenberg 
claiming allegiance to the new Republic of Austria. 
The German-Bohemians (and Vienna) desperately embraced 
the principles of self-determination. The Czechs, however, 
by establishing a fait accompli by military occupation, by 
correctly pointing out the overwhelming economic and 
strategic necessity in keeping Bohemia whole, and by 
masterful manipulation of Allied fears of Bolshevism, French 
revanchement and everyone's desire for a speedy settlement, 
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were able to outstrip the highly principled but inapplicable 
ideologies of Wilson and establish the Republic of 
Czechoslovakia with three million Germans within its 
borders. 
The short-lived German-Bohemian government was never 
really a viable entity, but a reflection of the truly 
desperate situation the new Austrian government faced once 
the disintegration of the empire had denied food and fuel so 
necessary for survival. As for the German people in 
Bohemia, evidence would indicate that all industry and most 
of the German middle class wished incorporation into 
Czechoslovakia. 
A plebiscite, as was proposed by Vienna, would have 
been difficult to administer due chiefly to the unsettled 
international situation. For one thing, much would have 
depended on whether an Austro-German Anschluss would have 
been permitted. 
Despite criticism that all would have been different 
had three million Germans not been included in 
Czechoslovakia, the gentlemen in Paris, lacking any oracle 
to divine the future, made the only right choice. Did the 
Bohemian-Germans then have a legitimate right to the 
territorial demarcation in pre-War Bohemia? Based on 
generally accepted notions of the rights of cultural and 
economic preservation, the answer must certainly be yes. 
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To the Germans of Bohemia, their "home" was being 
invaded, and their home was simply that soil which they and 
their ancestors had occupied for centuries. They were not 
Germans from Germany, but Bohemians from Bohemia. What is 
more, the Germans who had settled in the mountains centuries 
earlier had not displaced Czechs as the Czechs were most 
certainly doing in their own economically-induced migration 
west into the German areas during the nineteenth century. 
Did, then, the Czechs have a legitimate right to 
migrate into the German areas in pre-War Bohemia? Based on 
the simple necessities of economics and the basic human need 
for survival, again the answer must be yes. 
To the Czechs, the changing economic pattern of the 
times simply implied the need to relocate within the country 
in order to eke out a living. If the admittedly medieval 
principle of Staatsrecht served to effectively thwart that 
impediment to the economic survival of the Czechs, then its 
use was as justified as the German principle of Zweiteilung 
which it challenged. 
To understand the application of these principles one 
must first understand the development of Staatsrecht. In 
actuality Zweiteilung was the consequence of Czech denial of 
German Staatsrecht, for by the mid-nineteenth century the 
meaning of Staatsrecht had become something other than what 
it originally had been. 
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Shortly after the Bohemian Crownlands had become merely 
the hereditary property of the ruling Austrian Habsburg 
Hausmacht, new definitions of man's place in his country and 
society had been formed. Emanating from revolutionary 
France had come the notion that one is no longer merely a 
subject of the almighty Crown, but a citizen of the state--
an equal participant subject to institutions of one's own 
making in a land of fellow citizens. A person became his 
own nobleman, subject not to a divine-rightest, high born 
monarch but to a community--a nation of his own kind. 
This new concept fit the circumstances in the Czech 
lands perfectly for, having been stripped of their king and 
reluctant to render blind obedience to a "foreign" prince in 
Vienna, the Czechs instead transferred their allegience to 
their own community--to Cheeky, the Czech word for Bohemia. 
The national identity needed a rallying point. Czechs 
needed something they all shared, yet no one else had. The 
language provided that rallying point. Just as German 
nationalists about the same time had suggested that the 
German language should stand as the basis for unification of 
"Germany," so too the Czechs saw in their language the thing 
common to them which gave them a national identity. This 
same practice has been used in modern times by separatist 
movements such as those found in Brittany, Provence, and the 
Basque Country as a means to promote the self-identity of 
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one's cultural uniqueness. 
In Bohemia this sense of self was aided by national 
leaders such as Palacky who, though forced to write in the 
German language, showed to the Czechs that they too had a 
culturally rich past in which they could take pride. Jan 
Havelecek began the Narodnf Listi during the 1830's, a 
newspaper still published today; poetry, theater and a new 
interest in Czech folk culture proliferated, all promoting 
the use of and pride in the "national" language as a tool to 
further the national mission. The importance of language 
has been demonstrated above. 
This process was further strengthened by the industrial 
revolution which, as has been shown, enabled hitherto 
disenfranchised Czechs to move up the social and political 
ladder. Significantly, the meteoric rise of the Czech 
middle class, especially after 1870, was not dependent upon 
"Germanizing" one's self. It was possible to be a success 
wholly as a Czech. 
Thus, one sees, the notion of Staatsrecht was 
applicable after the "l'etat est moi" concept was long dead 
because the notion of state had survived not as the property 
of the prince but of the people of the nation. 
The notion of Staatsrecht within the original, or 
nearly original, borders of the state hit a snag however 
when national aspirations became mixed with economical 
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realities. The Czechs could not reconcile their socio-
political ascendancy with the pro-Austrian German-Bohemians. 
Nor could they apply their language theory to the Germans 
which, of course, would have allowed them to join their 
fellow Germans in Austria, or even the Weimar Republic. 
Instead, the Czechs rather conveniently claimed Staatsrecht 
in its medieval context in an attempt to deny the Germans 
their own Staatsrecht in the modern context. What was first 
used as a tool to achieve Czech statehood within the 
Austrian Empire was now used internally to thwart German-
Bohemian self-determination. The Czech argument was that 
the old notion of Staatsrecht rendered the borders 
inviolable and that the whole of Bohemia should be subject 
to the majority will. The defensive policy of Zweiteilung 
was seen as secessionist and therefore the Germans as 
spoilers of the Bohemian State. 
The whole argument of the Czechs depended on their 
interpretation of just what the German presence represented 
in Bohemia. Were they fellow Bohemians who traced an 
ancestry back hundreds of years to pre-Habsburg times? Were 
they Austrians who, unlike the Czechs, remained faithful to 
their sovereign in Vienna during the First World War and, 
thus, was it not actually the rebellious Czechs who were 
secessionists? Or were they in fact German colonists and 
invaders who sould be removed from the scene? The Czechs 
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cerainly seemed to think the Bohemian-Germans fit the latter 
description when, in 1946, three million Germans were 
expelled from their homes and sent "back" to Germany. In 
fact, they could be labelled as all three, but mostly they 
were simply people living on their traditional land in their 
traditional culture and seeking through Zweiteilung the 
preservation of both. 
The truth is, of course, that the German-Czech conflict 
was only finally resolved by the expulsions mentioned above. 
The irony is that, according to The Sudetenland 
magazine, a bimonthly published by Sudetenlanders now living 
in Munich, by 1973 the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic had 
failed, but not through lack of trying, to resettle the 
mountainous areas in Bohemia where the Germans had once 
lived. 
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Map 1. Long Established German Areas in the Crownland of 
Bohemia. (Based on Czechs and Germans, by Eliza-
beth Wiskermann.) 
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German Population Distribution and Density in 
Early Twentieth Century. (Based on Czechoslovak 
source. The German Problem in Czechoslovakia, by 
Josef Chmelar.) 
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(Based on German source. Die Tschechoslawakei in Spiegel 
der Statistik, by Erwin Winkler.) 
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1. ?udweis 
2. Pilsen 
3. Eger 
4. Leitmeritz 
1 5. Reichenberg 
6. Trauntenau 
The Nationalist Union's German Proposal of May 1918 
for the Ethnic Administrative Partition of the 
Crownland of Bohemia. A later version dropped the 
city of Pilsen attaching the German Bezirke to the 
Eger Kreis. (Printed in the Prager Tagblatt, May 
22, 1918.) 
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